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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Fertilizer use is notably lower in most of Africa than in other developing regions.  Too little 
irrigation and varieties unresponsive to fertiliser may explain this to some degree.  But more 
often the finger is pointed at lack of credit, long distances between farmers and the nearest 
fertilizer retailer, weak market infrastructure, and liberalized crop input and output markets.  
Indeed, in many countries the withdrawal of state input delivery systems has seen fertiliser 
use fall as commercial distribution systems compete with subsidized government programs.  
Kenya, however, stands as a notable departure from this parallel input marketing model.  In 
the early 1990s fertiliser markets were liberalised, government price controls and import 
licensing quotas were eliminated, and fertilizer donations by external donor agencies were 
phased out.  Subsequently fertiliser use has almost doubled from the 1980s to recent years, 
much of the increase being registered on small farms.  Rates of fertiliser application on maize 
crops compare well with those seen in Asia and Latin America. 
 
How has this been achieved?  Liberalization, implemented for nearly 15 years without 
competing government subsidy programs, has induced tremendous private investment in 
fertilizer importation and retailing.  The average distance a farmer needs to travel to acquire 
fertiliser has fallen from more than 8 km in 1997 to just over 4 km in 2004.  Wholesalers and 
dealers have cut the cost of domestic marketing from US$245 to US$140 a ton.  Sustaining 
this momentum will require a pro-active role for government:  rehabilitating the rail system 
and port facilities, and supporting the integrity of market institutions and arrangements 
designed to promote input credit and output market access for small farmers. 
 
BACKGROUND: Fertilizer use has increased dramatically in Kenya since the fertilizer 
market was liberalized in the early 1990s. Kenya is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa 
that has achieved at least 30% growth in fertilizer use per cropped hectare over the past 
decade and which already started from a relatively high base (25kgs per hectare or more by 
the early 1990s).  Using national consumption figures, prior research has been unable to show 
whether small farmers or large farms and estates are driving this growth, whether the 
increased fertilizer consumption is being devoted to smallholder food crops or mainly 
industrial crops such as tea and sugarcane, or whether the growth in fertilizer use is 
attributable to any particular type of fertilizer delivery supply chains.  Our study sheds light 
on these three issues. 
 
OBJECTIVES:   The study aimed to identify the factors responsible for the growth in 
fertilizer use in Kenya since the early 1990s, and thereby provide policy lessons both for 
Kenya as well as for other African countries.  
  
DATA AND METHODS:  The main data come from a nationwide panel of 1,364 
smallholder households surveyed across four years between 1995/96 and 2003/04 by Egerton 
University’s Tegemeo Institute.  These were used to examine trends in fertilizer use by crop, 
region, and type of fertilizer supply chain.  
 
FINDINGS:  Over the past 10 years, fertilizer use per cropped hectare has risen by 35%.  
Total consumption has risen from a mean of roughly 180,000 tons per year during the 1980s, 
to 250,000 tons per year during the early 1990s, to over 325,000 tons in the 2000-2003 
periods.  In the most recent year for which data is available, 2004/05, Kenyan farmers 
consumed 351,776 metric tons of fertilizer.   iii
 
The evidence suggests that growth in fertilizer consumption is occurring on smallholder 
farms – it is not driven by large-scale or estate sector agriculture.  The proportion of small 
farmers using fertilizer has increased from 43% in 1995/96, to 51% in 1996/97, to 65% in 
1999/00 to 69% in 2003/04.  These rates vary considerably throughout the country, ranging 
from less than 10% of households surveyed in the drier lowland areas to over 85% of small 
farmers in Central Province and the High-Potential Maize Zones of the North Rift.   
Interestingly, across the entire sample of households, mean fertilizer use per hectare is 
virtually constant across farm size, suggesting that even small and poor farmers are 
increasingly gaining access to fertilizer.  
 
Kenya’s growth in fertilizer consumption is a phenomenon covering both food crops (mainly 
maize and domestic horticulture) as well as export crops such as tea, sugarcane, and coffee.  
Fertilizer use per hectare of maize cultivated has increased dramatically in all but the semi-
arid parts of the country. About 87% of small-scale farmers in the high-potential maize zones 
of Western Kenya now use fertilizer; those that use fertilizer apply roughly 163 kg per 
hectare on maize, higher than mean dose rates in South and East Asia.  The intensity of 
fertilizer use on maize has increased in spite of cutbacks in maize price supports by the 
government. However, fertilizer use remains limited in the drier regions mainly because of 
low profitability.  
 
The growth of fertilizer consumption in Kenya has been achieved without subsidies – in fact, 
fertilizer consumption has taken off rapidly since the early 1990s when the fertilizer market 
was liberalized and when fertilizer donations by external donor agencies were phased out.  
Commercial fertilizer imports are now roughly 3 times higher than levels achieved during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
Four main factors account for the expanded use of fertilizer by small farmers in Kenya:  First, 
the Government of Kenya has pursued a relatively stable fertilizer marketing policy since 
1990.  After the elimination of retail price controls, import licensing quotas, foreign exchange 
controls, and the phase-out of external fertilizer donation programs that disrupted commercial 
operations, Kenya has witnessed rapid investment in private fertilizer distribution networks, 
with over 10 importers, 500 wholesalers and 7,000 retailers now operating in the country.  
 
Secondly, and as a direct result of an increasingly dense network of fertilizer retailers 
operating in rural areas, the mean distance of small farmers to the nearest fertilizer retailer 
has declined from 8.4 km to 4.1 km between 1997 and 2004.  This has greatly expanded 
small farmers’ access to fertilizer, reduced transaction costs, and increased the profitability of 
using fertilizer.  
 
The third factor is intense competition in importing and wholesaling. Pressure to cut costs 
and innovate in logistics has cut domestic fertilizer marketing margins from $245 to $140 per 
ton.  Despite rising world prices, farm-gate fertilizer prices in Kenya have remained relatively 
constant over the past 10 years, partly due to the 55% reduction in fertilizer marketing costs 
from Mombasa to western Kenya.   
 
And fourth, the relative profitability of the domestic horticulture market -- 96% of all 
horticultural product sales in Kenya go into the domestic market, not the export market -- has 
raised farmers’ incentives to fertilize maize intercropped with horticultural crops. 
   iv
INSIGHTS FOR POLICY IN KENYA:  Kenya’s experience, though relatively successful, is 
fragile.  Sustaining the momentum will depend on commitment to supportive public 
investment and policy choices.  First, governance problems are jeopardizing the sustainability 
of many interlinked credit-input-crop marketing programs that worked well in the 1970s and 
1980s, and which laid the groundwork for investments in infrastructure, logistics, and 
commercial financing systems that facilitated subsequent growth in independent, cash-sale 
input supply systems serving small farmers.  Continued access to input credit for small 
farmers in many parts of the country will require government commitment to limit the 
potential for politicization and interference in the management of the interlinked market 
systems. Second, investment is needed in Kenya’s eroded rail, road, and port infrastructure.  
Third, for the first time in over a decade, the Kenyan government has, in the past two years, 
begun to sell fertilizer to farmers in high-potential areas, and the threat of government 
operations being expanded has sparked great uncertainty among private suppliers.  Much of 
this growth in commercial fertilizer supply channels since 1990 has been due to a clear policy 
environment in which the private investment incentives were not undermined by large-scale 
input subsidy programs that depressed commercial demand and created uncertainty about the 
viability of future investment, as witnessed in other African countries that initiated input 
market reforms.  
 
BROADER  LESSONS:  Are there lessons from Kenya for other Sub-Saharan African 
countries?  This study suggests the following: 
 
1. Fertilizer promotion requires a holistic approach.  It is not simply a technical or logistical 
problem of delivering fertilizer to small farmers and expecting a sustainable solution.   
Achieving sustained growth in fertilizer consumption involves building farmers’ effective 
demand for fertilizer, by making its use profitable, and building durable output markets that 
can absorb the increased output without gluts that depress producer prices.  This involves two 
major commitments from government:   
 
    (a) A supportive policy environment that attracts local and foreign direct investment in 
building sustainable fertilizer and crop output markets. The case of Kenya shows how a 
stable policy environment has encouraged a private sector response that has helped to make 
fertilizer accessible to most small farmers.  Importantly, this has involved reforms to the 
financial market (elimination of foreign exchange controls) as well as to fertilizer and crop 
markets. In other countries, the implementation of large subsidy programs has inhibited the 
type of private investment response seen in Kenya, due to the risk of huge losses that such 
programs inflict on commercial firms.  
 
    (b) A forward-looking approach to input market development also requires attention to the 
various factors affecting farmers’ willingness to pay for fertilizer.  Governments have a major 
role to play in raising farmers’ willingness to pay for fertilizer: invest in rural infrastructure, 
efficient port facilities, and standards of commerce to reduce the costs of distribution; fund 
agricultural research to produce seeds that respond to fertilizer; determine and disseminate 
fertilizer use recommendations that are appropriate for different areas (as opposed to one 
blanket recommendation for an entire country); nurture the development of rural financial 
systems, market information systems, institutions for contract enforcement, and 
telecommunications to attract new investments by commodity marketing firms.  These 
“public goods” investments, often considered outside the scope of fertilizer marketing policy, 
nevertheless strongly affect the demand for fertilizer and hence whether sustainable markets 
for fertilizer can arise.   v
  
2.   Credit facilities for low-income farmers are a priority.  In areas where fertilizer use is 
profitable, the use of credit targeted to low-income farmers can improve agricultural 
productivity and reduce poverty.  In Kenya’s case, its historic promotion of integrated input-
credit-output marketing arrangements for cash crops (such as sugar, coffee, and tea) have 
clearly promoted small-scale farmers’ access to credit, and this has contributed to relatively 
high levels of fertilizer use.  The integrated marketing arrangements have also provided the 
means for farmers to obtain fertilizer for their food crops, since the companies can recoup 
their loans for other crops as well when the farmers sell their cash crop back to the company.  
But in areas where fertilizer use on a particular crop is profitable, such as maize in the mid- 
and high-altitude areas of Western Kenya and horticulture in most parts of the country, most 
farmers have achieved reasonable levels of fertilizer use without credit.  
 
3. Good governance is critical for fertilizer promotion and agricultural development in 
general.  The coffee sub-sector illustrates how governance problems can cause farmers to dis-
invest in fertilizer and exit from the integrated credit-input-crop marketing systems that 
worked well in previous decades.   
 
4. Promising innovative systems to promote fertilizer use in the semi-arid parts of the country 
need to be expanded.  Programs such as the Farm Inputs Promotion (FIPS) and dealer credit 
and training programs combine farm extension knowledge and supply chain development to 
raise the profitability of supplying fertilizer by small dealers and of using fertilizer by small 
farmers.  
 
5.  What about subsidies?  Several countries in Africa are being urged to consider distributing 
free fertilizer to millions of small farmers as a means to reduce poverty and “kick-start” 
productivity growth.  From a welfare and poverty alleviation standpoint, a compelling case 
can be made to provide free or subsidized inputs for the poor.  But such programmes suffer 
from the difficulties of effective targeting and may stymie the development of sustainable 
commercial input delivery systems.  Their potential benefits for farmers are also vulnerable to 
being dissipated by corruption and divisive political battles.  Above all, the opportunity costs 
can be high, effectively crowding out public funding of other important investments to help 
reduce poverty and promote agricultural growth.  Moreover, there is little evidence from 
Africa that subsidies or other intensive fertilizer promotion programs have “kick-started” 
productivity growth among poor farmers in Africa enough to sustain high levels of input use 
once the programs end. 
 
Given scare resources, we must learn as much as possible from successful experiences in 
Africa and elsewhere. The experience of Kenya shows how a stable policy environment can 
foster a private sector response that supports smallholder agricultural productivity and 
poverty alleviation.  Ironically, many of these same goals – poverty alleviation, increased 
fertilizer use, and growth in small farm productivity – remain elusive in countries lacking a 
sustained commitment to the development of viable commercial input delivery systems.   
 
Fundamentally, and regardless of which type of marketing actor is chosen to do the job, 
substantially increased fertilizer use in Africa will require coming to grips with the need to 
reduce the high physical costs of exchange that impede marketing activities by all agents, 
whether they be private, parastatal, or cooperative.  Our analysis indicates that domestic 
marketing costs can be reduced through the following:  reducing port fees, coordinating the 
timing of fertilizer clearance from the port with up-country transport, reducing transport costs   vi
through port, rail, and road improvements, reducing taxes on fuel, and reducing the 
uncertainty associated with government input distribution programs that impose additional 
marketing costs on traders.     vii
 
 
Factors Driving the Growth in Fertilizer Consumption 
in Kenya, 1990-2005: 
 
Sustaining the Momentum in Kenya and Lessons 









Support for this research has been provided by the Tegemeo Agricultural Monitoring and 
Policy Analysis Project (TAMPA) between Tegemeo Institute/Egerton University and the 
Department of Agricultural Economics at Michigan State University. Financial support for 
this project is provided by the American people, via the Kenya Mission of the United States 
Agency for International Development.  Additional support is also provided by MSU through 
resources from the Food Security III Cooperative Agreement.   
 
Research assistance from Elliot Mghenyi is gratefully acknowledged, as well as comments 
received on an earlier draft from Paul Gamba, Milu Muyanga, Steve Wiggins, Eric Crawford, 



































   ix
CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................ii 
LIST OF TABLES.....................................................................................................................x 
LIST OF FIGURES..................................................................................................................xi 
1.   Background..........................................................................................................................1 
1.1 Objectives....................................................................................................................4 
2.  Methods and Data.................................................................................................................5 
3.  Kenya’s Market Situation.....................................................................................................6 
3.1   Aggregate Use and Imports Trends...........................................................................8 
4.   Fertilizer Distribution Systems in Kenya...........................................................................10 
4.1 Commodity-based Interlinked Input-Credit-Output Marketing Arrangements ........10 
4.2   Open Market Commercial Fertilizer Sub-Systems..................................................11 
5.   Household-Level Fertilizer Use Patterns...........................................................................12 
5.1   Crops Accounting for Increased Use of Fertilizer...................................................13 
5.2 Is Fertilizer Mainly Being Used by Larger Farms?...................................................16 
5.3 Effect of Wealth on Fertilizer use and Access to Credit...........................................21 
6.  Trends in Fertilizer Prices and Marketing Margins............................................................26 
6.1 Financial Cost Accounting of Fertilizer Prices in Kenya..........................................26 
6.2 Trends in Domestic Fertilizer Marketing Margins....................................................28 
6.3 Trends in Maize-Fertilizer Price Ratios ....................................................................30 
6.4 Opportunities to Further Reduce Marketing Margins in Kenya................................32 
7.  Analysis of Alternative Fertilizer Delivery Systems in Kenya...........................................33 
7.1  Sugarcane - Mumias.................................................................................................33 
7.2 Sugarcane – Nyanza outgrower programs.................................................................34 
7.3 Tea – KTDA interlinked system................................................................................35 
7.4 Open Market Commercial system (maize, wheat, and horticulture).........................38 
7.5   Coffee Cooperatives (Murang’a, Meru, Nyeri).......................................................39 
7.6 Donor-Supported Initiatives to Raise Fertilizer Use.................................................41 
8.  Reasons for Small Farmers’ Increased Use of Fertilizer in Kenya (1996-2004)................43 
8.1   Small-farmers’ improved proximity to fertilizer retailers.......................................43 
8.2 Lower Domestic Fertilizer Marketing Margins.........................................................45 
8.3   Shifts in maize cultivation from mono-crop to intercrop with high-valued 
horticulture crops.................................................................................................45 
9.  Conclusions:  Implications for Policies and Programs.......................................................45 
9.1 Factors Driving the Rise in Fertilizer Use in Kenya .................................................46 
9.2   Potential for Replicability?......................................................................................49 
References................................................................................................................................52 
APPENDIX 1.  TOTAL FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION IN KENYA.........................54 
APPENDIX 2.  NOMINAL AND REAL MAIZE WHOLESALE PRICES, VARIOUS 
MARKETS IN WESTERN KENYA, 1985/96 TO 2003/04. .............................55 
APPENDIX 3.  NOMINAL PRICE OF DAP FERTILIZER AND WHOLESALE 
MAIZE-TO-DAP PRICE RATIOS (1KG MAIZE/1KG DAP)..........................56 
APPENDIX 4.  COST BUILD-UP FOR CAN FROM ROMANIA, JUNE 2004..........57 
APPENDIX 5.  COST BUILD-UP FOR DAP, JUNE 2005...........................................58 
APPENDIX 6.  US$ DAP FERTILIZER PRICES AT MOMBASA AND NAKURU, 
AND THE DAP MARKETING MARGIN, 1990/01-2004/05 Error! Bookmark 
not defined.   x
APPENDIX 7.  REAL KENYAN SHILLING DAP PRICES AT MOMBASA AND 
NAKURU, AND MARKETING MARGINS (2005 KSH PER 50KGS)...........23 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1. FERTILIZER USE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA COMPARED TO OTHER 
REGIONS..........................................................................................................................1 
TABLE 2.   FERTILIZER USE INTENSITY AND GROWTH TRENDS IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA.........................................................................................................3 
TABLE 3. WHOLESALE MAIZE-FERTILIZER PRICE RATIOS (1KG MAIZE-TO-1KG 
DAP FERTILIZER)...........................................................................................................6 
TABLE 4. CATEGORIES AND CONSUMPTION PERCENTAGES FOR FERTILIZERS, 
1990-1999..........................................................................................................................7 
TABLE 5. FIVE-YEAR AVERAGE IMPORT TRENDS (TONS)..........................................8 
TABLE 6. FERTILIZER IMPORTS BY COMPANY (2003)..................................................9 
TABLE 7. FERTILIZER USAGE, TEGEMEO NATIONWIDE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 
AND NATIONAL MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE ESTIMATES.............................12 
TABLE 8. PERCENT OF SMALL-SCALE HOUSEHOLDS USING FERTILIZER, BY 
REGION AND CROP YEAR (1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/00, 2003/04)...........................14 
TABLE 9. DOSE RATES AND PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS APPLYING FERTILIZER 
FOR DIFFERENT CROP AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS..............................................15 
TABLE 10. FERTILIZER USE ON MAIZE PLOTS, 1996/97, 1999/00, AND 2003/04......18 
TABLE 11. FERTILIZER USE PER HECTARE CULTIVATED ON SPECIFIC CROPS, 
1996/97, 1999/00 AND 2003/04 CROP SEASONS.......................................................19 
TABLE 12: STATISTICS ON FERTILIZER USE AND CREDIT ACROSS WEALTH 
TERCILES BY CROP (1997, 2000, 2004).....................................................................22 
TABLE 13. SOURCES OF FERTILIZER CREDIT FOR DIFFERENT CROPS* (2000 AND 
2004)................................................................................................................................23 
TABLE 14. SOURCES OF FERTILIZER CREDIT BY ASSET GROUP (2000 AND 2004) 
FOR ALL CROPS...........................................................................................................24 
TABLE 15. CAN COST COMPONENTS..............................................................................27 
TABLE 16.  INCOMES, ASSETS, AND APPLICATION RATES FOR WESTERN 
TRANSITIONAL ZONE (BUNGOMA AND KAKAMEGA) –MUMIAS...................34 
TABLE 17.  INCOMES, LAND, ASSETS, AND FERTILIZER APPLICATION RATES 
FOR WESTERN LOWLANDS ZONE (KISUMU AND SIAYA) ................................35 
TABLE 18. TEGEMEO PANEL DATA STATISTICS ON PERCENT OF TEA AREA 
FERTILIZED, APPLICATION RATES, AND NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS USING 
FERTILIZER IN TEA.....................................................................................................38 
TABLE 19. MEAN STATISTICS FOR SMALL FARM COFFEE GROWING 
HOUSEHOLDS, COMPARING THE RELATIVELY EFFICIENT CENTRAL 
HIGHLANDS TO THE WESTERN AND EASTERN COFFEE GROWING AREAS 41 
TABLE 20. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FARM HOUSEHOLDS, GROUPED WITH 














LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1. FERTILIZER TRENDS IN KENYA.....................................................................4 
FIGURE 2. MEAN HOUSEHOLD FERTILIZER USE PER ACRE BY FARM SIZE.........20 
FIGURE 3.  FERTILIZER USE AMONG SMALLHOLDERS BY HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 
(1997, 2000, AND 2004 COMBINED)...........................................................................25 
FIGURE 4.  FERTILIZER USE AMONG SMALLHOLDERS BY HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 
AND CROP, 1997, 2000, AND 2004..............................Error! Bookmark not defined. 
FIGURE 5. INTENSITY OF FERTILIZER USE BY HOUSEHOLD ASSETS, 
SMALLHOLDER FARMS, 1997, 2000 AND 2004.......................................................26 
FIGURE 6. NAKURU - MOMBASA COST DIFFERENCES (DI-AMMONIUN 
PHOSPHATE, US$/TON NOMINAL)...........................................................................29 
FIGURE 7. NAKURU - MOMBASA COST DIFFERENCES, DI-AMMONIUN 
PHOSPHATE (DAP), REAL KSHS PER 50KGS (2005=1)..........................................29 
FIGURE 8.  PRICE RATIOS, WHOLESALE MAIZE / DAP FERTILIZER AT MOMBASA 
(90KG MAIZE/50KG FERTILIZER).............................................................................31 
FIGURE 9. PRICE RATIOS, WHOLESALE MAIZE / DAP FERTILIZER AT NAKURU 
(KSHS 90KG MAIZE / KSHS 50KG FERTILIZER).....................................................31 
FIGURE 10. IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION TRENDS FOR TEA FERTILIZERS .......37 





















   xii
 
 
   1
1.   Background 
 
Fertilizer application rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are the lowest of any region of the 
world.  The average intensity of fertilizer use throughout SSA was roughly 9 kilograms per 
hectare between 2000 and 2002 -- much lower than elsewhere (86 kg/ha in Latin America, 
104 kg/ha in South Asia, and 142 kg/ha in Southeast Asia, averaged over the 2000/01 and 
2002/03 years).  
 
TABLE 1. FERTILIZER USE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA COMPARED TO 
OTHER REGIONS 
Region  2000/01 2002/03
(Kg of fertilizer nutrient per hectare of cultivated land) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  9 9
South Asia  109 100
East and Southeast Asia  149 135
Latin America  99 73
Source: FAO, 2004. 
  
Since the decade of the 1980s to the 1996-2000 period, fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa) has risen only 17%, from 1.09 million tons in the 1980-89 period to 
1.26 million tons.  Over the same period, fertilizer use intensity, defined as the kilograms of 
fertilizer consumed per hectare of cultivated land, rose by only 5%.  
 
Kherallah et al. (2002) give the following reasons for the low usage of fertilizer in Africa: 
 
•  Fertilizer costs in Africa are higher than in Latin America and Asia mostly due 
additional transport costs related to under-developed physical infrastructure; 
•  Africa has a much lower proportion of irrigated land than in other continents; 
•  African farmers rely more on traditional crop varieties that are less responsive to 
fertilizers than in Asia and Latin America where modern varieties of wheat and rice 
are highly responsive to fertilizer; 
•  Most areas of Africa have relatively low population density, providing less incentive 
to invest in land-saving technology.  
 
However, in a broader context, the reasons for the low application rates are often attributed to 
a political-economic environment that is not conducive to private investment and 
competition, under-provision of public investments on improved fertilizer-responsive seed 
varieties, extension messages to help farmers use appropriate levels and combinations of 
fertilizer for their specific conditions, transport infrastructure that could reduce farmers’ costs 
/ improve profitability of using fertilizer, and financial constraints on the purchase of 
fertilizer where much of the population earn less than a dollar per day per capita.  
 
Despite the lower aggregate trends in fertilizer use in Africa compared to some parts of the 
World, the figures in Table 1 mask great variability in fertilizer use trends within Africa.  
Table 2 shows fertilizer use trends for the 30 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which data   2
is available on the FAOStat website.
2  South Africa was excluded to maintain the focus on 
smallholder agriculture.  The countries are subdivided into four groups: 
 
1.  low and stagnant fertilizer use:   fertilizer use less than 25 kgs/ha during the 1996-2002 
period, and less than a 30% increase in fertilizer use per cultivated hectare between the 1990-
95 and 1996-2002 periods.  Of the 30 countries for which data was available, 13 sub-Saharan 
African countries fit into this category (top-left quadrant in Table 2).  
 
2.  Low use but rising trend in fertilizer use intensity:  fertilizer use less than 25 kgs/ha 
during the 1996-2002 period, but greater than 30% increase in fertilizer use per cultivated 
hectare between the 1990-95 and 1996-2002 periods.  Thirteen (13) of the 30 countries fit in 
this category (top-right quadrant in Table 2). 
 
3.  Relatively high fertilizer use but stagnant trend:   fertilizer use greater than 25 kgs/ha 
during the 1996-2002 period, but less than a 30% increase in fertilizer use per cultivated 
hectare between the 1990-95 and 1996-2002 periods.  Three countries fit this category 
(bottom-left quadrant in Table 2).  
 
4.  Relatively high fertilizer use and a growing trend in fertilizer use intensity:  fertilizer use 
greater than 25 kgs/ha during the 1996-2002 period, and a greater than 30% increase in 
fertilizer use per cultivated hectare between the 1990-95 and 1996-2002 periods.  Only one 
country – Kenya – fit in this category (bottom-right quadrant).  
 
Table 2 shows that over the 1996-2002 period, all of the 30 countries except four from 
Eastern and Southern Africa remained at a low level of fertilizer use – below 25 kgs of 
fertilizer nutrient per hectare cultivated.  However, about half of the 30 countries registered 
rapid growth in fertilizer intensity,
3 albeit from small initial levels in the early 1990s. 
 
Of the four countries using over 25 kg per hectare during the 1990s, three of them displayed 
moderate or negative growth between the 1990-95 and 1996-2002 periods (Malawi, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), while only one country—Kenya—has achieved more than a 30% 
increase in fertilizer use intensity over this period.   
 
Fertilizer use in Kenya has risen from a mean of roughly 180,000 tons per year during the 
1980s, to 250,000 tons per year during the early 1990s, to over 325,000 tons in the 1996-2003 
periods (Figure 1).
4  In the most recent year for which data is available, 2004/05, Kenyan 







                                                 
2 See : http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?subset=agriculture 
3 Fertilizer use intensity is defined as kg of fertilizer nutrient applied per hectare cultivated to annual and 
permanent crops. Growth in fertilizer use intensity is defined as the percentage increase in mean fertilizer use 
intensity for 1996-2002 and the 1990-1995 periods. Numbers in parentheses are mean fertilizer use intensity for 
1996-2002, and the percentage increase in fertilizer use intensity as defined above. 
4 Annual data on fertilizer consumption in Kenya are drawn from the Ministry of Agriculture, Government 
of Kenya, and presented in Appendix 1.    3
 
TABLE 2.   FERTILIZER USE INTENSITY AND GROWTH TRENDS IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
              % growth in fertilizer use intensity (kg/ha cultivated) 
                          (mean 1996-2002 / mean 1990-95) 
Intensity of 
fertilizer use, 
1996-2002  < +30%  > +30% 
< 25 kg/ha   
        DRC               (0.5, -47%) 
        Angola           (0.7, -69%) 
        Niger              (0.9, +5%) 
        Guinea            (2.0, -4%) 
        Burundi          (2.3, -6%) 
        Madagascar    (2.9, -8%) 
        Mauritania      (4.0, -64%) 
        Tanzania         (4.8, -47%) 
        Gambia           (5.2, +15%) 
        Nigeria           (5.6, -73%) 
        Burkina Faso  (5.9, -28%) 
        Zambia           (8.4, -34%) 
        Mali                (9.0, +7%) 
                 
 
 
        Uganda               (0.6, +237%) 
        Rwanda               (1.8, +89%) 
        Mozambique       (3.2, +142%) 
        Ghana                  (3.6, +68%) 
        Chad                    (4.3, +93%) 
        Cameroon            (5.9, +77%) 
        Togo                    (7.0, +30%) 
        Cote d’Ivoire       (11.8, +53%)  
        Botswana             (11.8, +294%) 
        Senegal                (13.2, +67%) 
        Ethiopia               (14.4, +71%) 
        Benin                   (17.6, +76%) 
        Lesotho                (23.2, +35%) 
 
> 25 kg/ha          Swaziland  (30.5, -40%) 
        Malawi      (30.8, +9%)  
        Zimbabwe  (48.3, +9%) 
 
        Kenya (31.8, +33%) 
 
 
Note:  numbers in parentheses are mean kgs of fertilizer applied per hectare cultivated, and the 
percentage growth in fertilizer use intensity between 1990-1995 and 1996-2002. 




About 87 percent of small-scale farmers in the high-potential maize zones of Western Kenya 
use fertilizer; those that use fertilizer apply roughly 163kgs per hectare on maize, higher than 
mean levels obtained in South and East Asia.  As will be presented in detail below, the 
evidence suggests that this growth in fertilizer consumption is occurring on smallholder farms 
– it is not driven by large-scale or estate sector agriculture.  Moreover, Kenya’s growth in 
fertilizer consumption is a phenomenon covering both food crops (mainly maize and 
domestic horticulture) as well as export crops such as tea, sugarcane, and coffee.  And we 
find that geographically, the growth in fertilizer use is occurring in about half of Kenya’s 
small farmer areas – those that cover the high and medium potential zones.  
 
Fertilizer use remains limited in the drier regions where profitability is most likely a major 
constraint on demand.  It is noteworthy that the growth of fertilizer consumption in Kenya 
over the past decade has been achieved with no fertilizer subsidy programs – in fact, 
smallholder fertilizer consumption has taken off rapidly since the early 1990s when the 
fertilizer market was liberalized and when fertilizer donations by external donor agencies 
were phased out.  After the elimination of retail price controls, import licensing quotas, and 
foreign exchange controls, Kenya has witnessed a rapid expansion in private fertilizer 
distribution, with over 500 wholesalers and 7,000 retailers operating in the country.  The   4
mean distance of small farmers to the nearest fertilizer retailer has declined from 8.4kms to 
4.1kms between 1997 and 2004.  The growth in commercial fertilizer imports (i.e., by private 
firms) has risen as donor imports have progressively declined over the years from a high of 
48% of total imports in the early 1990s before liberalization to zero over the past several 
years.  Commercial fertilizer imports are now roughly 3 times higher than levels achieved 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Note:  *Imports include donor shipments; no donor shipments since 2001. 
Source: MoA  
 
 
Relative to fertilizer use trends in most other sub-Saharan African countries, Kenya’s 
experience can be categorized as successful.  But, as we will see, it is a fragile success.  Its 




Our objectives are threefold.  Because current debates over the most effective ways to 
achieve rapid growth in fertilizer use in Kenya as well as more widely in Africa may be 
meaningfully informed by studying areas where this growth has actually happened, our first 
objective is to identify the main factors driving smallholders’ expanded use of fertilizer in 
Kenya.  In particular, we explore whether it is possible to attribute the growth in fertilizer use 
in Kenya to particular types of fertilizer delivery systems.  A number of fertilizer distribution 
channels serve smallholder farmers in Kenya, ranging from vertically integrated interlocked 
credit-input-output marketing schemes to independent importer-wholesaler-retailer supply 
chains.   
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A second objective of the study is to guide the Government of Kenya in its own deliberations 
on future fertilizer marketing policy and investments. The GOK has developed a new 
Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) and the supporting sectoral Strategy for Revitalizing 
Agriculture (SRA) both of which identify agricultural productivity growth as a key objective.  
A critical factor in raising agricultural productivity is the use of modern inputs, such as 
fertilizers and improved seed varieties/planting materials.  One of the main aims of this study 
is to provide information to assist Kenyan policy makers in sustaining the growth in 
smallholder fertilizer use.  
 
A third objective is to generate a better understanding of the types of fertilizer policy as well 
as distribution channels fueling the growth in consumption in Kenya and the sustainability of 
these delivery systems as part of helping guide other African countries in the design of their 
own fertilizer marketing policies and programs. 
 
 
2.  Methods and Data  
 
The study’s findings are based on three types of information and analyses: 
 
1.  Review of secondary data on trends in fertilizer use, prices and other salient indicators 
for the four main fertilizer delivery system types:  (a) integrated sugarcane outgrower 
arrangements, where fertilizer is supplied on credit to participating farmers, mainly for sugar 
production but also for other crops;  (b) integrated tea input-credit-sale systems; (c) integrated 
coffee input-credit-sale systems; and (d) independent fertilizer supply chains for crops not 
involved in coordinated input-sale-cash arrangements, mainly for maize.  This information is 
obtained through the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
2.  Interviews of key informants in the fertilizer industry and with representatives of 
interlinked fertilizer delivery systems.  These interviews were carried out in April and May 
2005 to obtain detailed institutional and organizational information on price and supply risks, 
contract non-compliance risks, potential impacted information problems, and coordination 
arrangements with buyers and sellers in the vertical supply chain, cost structure, etc. 
 
3.  Analysis of small farm household panel survey data to assess fertilizer consumption 
trends by crop, fertilizer intensity rates by type of delivery system, characteristics of 
households participating in these fertilizer delivery programs compared to households in the 
same areas but not participating in these schemes.  This information is obtained through 
descriptive analysis of the Tegemeo/MSU Household Survey Database from the crop years 
1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/00, and 2003/04.  Analysis is based on survey of 1,364 small-scale 
farming households consistently surveyed across all four cropping seasons.  The survey was 
designed and implemented under the Tegemeo Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis 
Project (TAMPA), implemented by Egerton University/Tegemeo Institute, with support from 
Michigan State University.  The sampling frame for the survey was prepared in consultation 
with the Central Bureau of Statistics; although CBS’s agricultural sample frame was not 
made available.  Twenty-four (24) districts were purposively chosen to represent the broad 
range of agro-ecological zones (AEZ) and agricultural production systems in Kenya.  Next, 
all non-urban divisions were assigned to one or more AEZ based on secondary data.  Third, 
proportionally to population across AEZs, divisions were selected from each AEZ.  Fourth, 
within each division, villages and households were randomly selected.  As a result, a total of   6
1,578 households were chosen from 24 districts within the eight agriculturally-oriented 
provinces of the country.  After excluding large farms over 50 acres, two pastoral areas, and 
households dropped from the sample due to attrition, 1,364 households had data available for 
each of the four cropping seasons 1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/2000 and 2003/04.  This 
longitudinal data on 1,364 households forms the basis for the analysis presented in this report.  
 
Some background is warranted on these four cropping seasons.  1995 was a good production 
year in Western and Central Kenya, and maize/fertilizer price ratios were relatively low, 
ranging from 0.27 to 0.32 in Eldoret, Kitale, and Nakuru.  These price ratios are computed as 
the price of DAP in early 1995 compared to maize prices in 1994/95 (July 1994 to June 
1995).  Maize prices for the 1995/96 season were not known at the time of planting in 1995 
when farmers purchase their basal fertilizers; hence farmers’ perceptions of maize prices may 
be most straightforwardly approximated as the price over the past season.  The beginning of 
the 1996 main planting period was characterized by relatively low maize prices following a 
favorable 1995 harvest, and high international fertilizer prices.  The maize-fertilizer price 
ratios in Western Kenya 1996 were therefore even worse than the previous year, ranging 
from 0.25 to 0.29 (see Table 3).   
 
By contrast, the 1998 main harvest in Western Kenya was poor, which contributed to 
relatively high maize prices in the first 5 months of 1999.  Consequently, maize/DAP 
fertilizer price ratios were relatively high (0.37 to 0.45) at the time that farmers made their 
basal planting decisions for the main crop in 1999.  We might therefore expect to see a 
somewhat greater incentive for farmers to apply fertilizer, at least on maize (but other annual 
crops too to the extent that crop harvests are correlated) in the 1999/00 season than in the 
previous 1996/97 season.   
 
TABLE 3. WHOLESALE MAIZE-FERTILIZER PRICE RATIOS (1KG MAIZE-TO-
1KG DAP FERTILIZER) 
Period Eldoret  Kitale  Nakuru 
1995/96  0.392 0.337 0.397 
1996/97  0.265 0.253 0.290 
1999/00  0.376 0.457 0.405 
2003/04 Na  0.293  0.373 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture, Market Information Bureau.  Raw data provided in Appendices 2 
and 3. Note:  ‘Na’ data not available. 
 
Lastly, the maize-DAP fertilizer price ratio at the main season planting time in 2003 was 0.29 
to 0.37, indicating a roughly similar situation for the 2003/04 survey as in the 1995/96 
survey.  Trends in maize fertilizer-price ratios over time are presented in more detail later. 
 
3.  Kenya’s Market Situation 
 
From 1974 to 1984, the Government of Kenya (GOK) provided a fertilizer importation 
monopoly to one firm, the Kenya Farmers Association.  The monopoly position of KFA was 
later viewed as an impediment to the development of the fertilizer market, and during the rest 
of the 1980s, the GOK tried to encourage other firms to enter the market albeit under very 
tight controls.  Fertilizer traders were to adhere to official prices set at 54 market centers 
throughout the country.  The GOK determined which firms were allowed to operate, through   7
licensing requirements and the allocation of foreign exchange (Argwings-Kodhek, 1996).   
Kimuyu (1994) argues that the licensing process provided rent-seeking opportunities for 
public sector officials, the costs of which had to be absorbed by trading firms who were 
mandated to operate within the trading margins afforded by the control price structure.   
Donor fertilizer aid, accounting for over half of total imports during the late 1980s, was 
poorly coordinated with commercial imports, leading to frequent oversupply and deficit 
(Kimuyu, 1994).  Moreover, the GOK increasingly recognized that its controlled pricing 
structure did not ensure adequate margins for retailers to supply the relatively distant rural 
areas. While the controlled pricing structure was designed to improve farmers’ access to 
fertilizer, it had the opposite effect in the more remote areas. 
 
These concerns led the GOK to reform its fertilizer marketing system. By 1993, prices were 
decontrolled, donor imports dwindled to 5 percent of total consumption, and small-scale 
farmers relied exclusively on the private sector and cooperatives for fertilizer.  Allgood and 
Kilungo (1996) report that by 1996, there were 12 major importers, 500 wholesalers, and 
roughly 5,000 retailers distributing fertilizer in the country.  IFDC (2001) estimates that the 
number of retailers rose to between 7,000 and 8,000 by 2000.  Some of the largest importers 
were cooperatives and estate firms supplying their members, most of whom were small-scale 
farmers participating in tea, coffee, and sugarcane outgrower schemes.  
 
Fertilizers used in Kenya are procured from several parts of the world depending on world 
market prices and financing arrangements. Most of the fertilizers are targeted to arrive at the 
onset of the long rains and short rains seasons to minimize storage costs that could arise in 
the event of carryover stocks.  Fertilizer sales are seasonal with 89% of sales occurring 
between March-April of each year (Global Development Solutions, 2005). A large proportion 
of Kenya imports come from Romania, Ukraine, the USA, Europe, Middle East, and South 
Africa.  New sources of special fertilizers for horticulture are India, China and Singapore.  
 
Basal fertilizers (used on annual crops at the land preparation stage) account for 44% of 
fertilizer consumed between 1990 and 1999, followed by top dressing types of fertilizers that 
account for 23% (Table 4).  Tea fertilizers, imported solely through Kenya Tea Development 
Agency, account for 21% of national consumption. Of total imports, Di-Ammonium 
Phosphate (DAP) accounted for roughly 28%, Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) 20%, and 
Nitrogen Phosphorous Potassium (NPK) accounted for 20% of the imports (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Gitonga, Nyoro).  
 
 
TABLE 4. CATEGORIES AND CONSUMPTION PERCENTAGES FOR 
FERTILIZERS, 1990-1999 
 
Fertilizer Category  Specific types  % of national consumption 
Planting  Types  DAP, MAP, TSP, SSP, NPK 
23:23:0, NPK 20:20:0 
44% 
Top Dressing Types  CAN, UREA,ASN, SA  23% 
Tea  NPK 25:5:5s, NPK 22:21:17  21% 
Coffee NPKs  7% 
Special types  ---  5% 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Tegemeo  
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3.1   Aggregate Use and Imports Trends   
 
To better understand the impact of fertilizer market reform there is need to study fertilizer 
consumption data at disaggregated levels - small-scale and large-scale/estate sectors, and 
between aid vs. commercial sales. Few countries report data in such a disaggregated way.  
Kenyan fertilizer use data from the Ministry of Agriculture is disaggregated between 
commercial and donor-financed imports, and by type of fertilizer.  But because consumption 
estimates are not disaggregated between small-scale and large-scale sectors, national level 
fertilizer consumption data cannot be used to infer whether this growth measured over the 
past decade indicates increased consumption by smallholder farmers.  However, we will 
explore this issue in more detail later through the use of the nationwide Tegemeo Institute 
household surveys of small-scale farmers in the 1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/00, and 2003/04 
seasons. 
 
Fertilizer import and consumption data in Table 5 show a steady increase in the use of all 
fertilizers after the start of fertilizer market reform in 1990.  Breaking the years 1989/90 to 
2003/2004 into three five-year periods it is clear that, although there was some growth in 
fertilizer consumption directly after fertilizer market reform, the greatest increase in fertilizer 
use has occurred in the 1999/00 to 2003/04 period.    
 
TABLE 5. FIVE-YEAR AVERAGE IMPORT TRENDS (TONS) 
Type of Fertilizer  1989/90 – 1993/94 1994/95 – 1998/99  1999/00 -2003/04
 







 Top-Dressing Types   56,221 52,844  91,618
 Tea Fertilizers   50,645 51,998  95,309
 Coffee Fertilizers   16,236 19,471  11,177
 Special Types  
 
8,475 14,958 18,862
GRAND TOTAL:   Imports 







         Source: MoA and Authors’ Compilation 
 
 
Between the periods 1994/95-1998/99 and 1999/00 – 2003/04, fertilizer consumption has 
increased by 26%.   There has been especially high growth in the imports of top-dressing 
fertilizers such as urea and CAN (used mostly on maize and wheat), and tea fertilizers.  The 
large increase in top-dress fertilizers, given their types, are most likely reflecting an increased 
use of top dressing fertilizers on maize, wheat and horticultural crops.  Importation of 
planting fertilizer (used on maize, horticulture, and sugar) has also increased by 26% since 
the late 1990s.  Tea fertilizer imports have risen by 85% from the previous period.  The only 
clear decline in fertilizer importation for the 1994-98 to 1999-2003 periods has been 
associated with fertilizers used on coffee which declined by 11%.  This is not surprising, 
given the slumping production incentives that coffee farmers have experienced over the 
years, due to the progressive weakening of the coffee cooperatives and unions associated with 
increased political interference in the coffee sector.   
 
Table 6 shows high fertilizer industry concentration at the stage of importation, with the top 
four importers accounting for 85% of the market.  Norsk Hydro, now operating as Yara Ltd 
in Kenya, accounts for almost 40% of the fertilizer imported into Kenya.  However, the sub-  9
sector is not vertically integrated; importers sell to wholesalers and retailers who have no 
equity relationships in their respective importing businesses.  Competition appears to be 
reasonably strong, with most of the importers having access to international price information 
via internet and other sources on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Some of the importing firms enter into agreements with each other to coordinate fertilizer 
shipments to reduce freight charges.  While CIF Mombasa prices (the price after the fertilizer 
has been offloaded, cleared through the port, taxes and fees levied, and ready for transport 
up-country) appear to be relatively high compared to other coastal areas in Africa, this is 
mostly due to high inspection levies, demurrage charges and other costs associated with 
inefficiencies at the port of Mombasa.
5  In a study of financial cost accounting at the various 
stages of Kenya’s fertilizer marketing system, Wanzala et al (2002) found that importers’ 
profit margin was in the range of 3-4% of the farm-gate price of fertilizer in Western Kenya.  
This corroborates findings by IFDC (2001) for Kenya and Uganda, and by Omamo (2002), 
who found net margins in the range of 2% to 5% for fertilizer traders in Uganda. While 
importer mark-up margins appear to be consistent with costs, it is important for longer-run 
policy to note that nearly 60% of the fertilizer imported into Kenya is handled through two 
private firms.  This has prompted fears that collusion could raise domestic marketing 
margins, but in actuality, marketing margins (defined here as the difference between CIF 
Mombasa and wholesale prices in Nakuru) have declined markedly over the 1995-2005 
period (discussed in detail in Section 6.2). 
 
Competition at the wholesale and retail end of the system appears to be vibrant (Table 6).  As 
will be indicated in later sections of this report, there has been a substantial decline in  
 
TABLE 6.  FERTILIZER IMPORTS BY COMPANY (2003) 
Import Firm  Tons Percent of Total
Norsk Hydro (Now Yara Ltd)         141,618  38%
Mea Ltd           73,836  20%
KTDA           68,460  18%
Supplies & Services Ltd            34,197  9%
Shah Kanji Lalji & Sons (K) Ltd           22,050  6%
Bat (K) Ltd           10,984  3%
Metro Plastics Ltd             8,800  2%
M.O.A.R.D             6,413  2%
M.O.A.R.D./JICA             3,339  1%
Export Trading Co. Ltd             2,200  1%
Totals         371,896 100%
Source: Author’s Compilation, NCPB, MoA  
 
 
                                                 
5 For example, one importer regularly hires students from Nairobi as tally clerks, sends them by bus to the Port 
of Mombasa, pays them Ksh1,000/person/day and provides free meals so  that they can count the number of 
bags being loaded and to provide some administrative  support which should otherwise be provided by the Port 
Authority (Global Development Solutions, 2005).  Firms also complain about the slowness of offloading, due 
both to the deterioration of physical facilities at the Port and to the use of Port-mandated stevedoring and 
workers.  It is sometimes in the importers’ interests to provide informal incentives to speed up worker efficiency 
to avoid demurrage changes.    
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domestic fertilizer marketing margins (the difference between the price of fertilizer CIF 
Mombasa and the retail price of fertilizer in western Kenya over the past 10 years. The 
number of dealers engaged at wholesale and retail levels has expanded rapidly following 
fertilizer market reform in 1990.  Furthermore the removal of retail price controls has allowed 
the dealers to apply realistic marketing margins to deliver fertilizer in areas with high 
transport costs, which has expanded smallholder access to fertilizer in relatively remote areas.   
 
 
4.   Fertilizer Distribution Systems in Kenya  
 
Kenyan smallholders are served by a variety of fertilizer delivery channels operating within 
the overall fertilizer marketing system.  In a broad categorization, there are two main types of 
fertilizer channels serving the small farm community in Kenya.  The first is the commodity-
based interlinked input-credit-output marketing systems.  The other is the un-integrated 
system of independent importers, wholesalers, and retailers operating on a cash basis. 
 
4.1 Commodity-based Interlinked Input-Credit-Output Marketing Arrangements 
 
Under these interlinked programs, the marketing firms offer fertilizer on credit to farmers 
with the condition that they have the exclusive right to sell the output on behalf of the 
farmers.  In this way, the firms are able to recover their costs from the sales before releasing 
the balance to growers.  The main three interlinked models in Kenya involve the Kenya Tea 
Development Agency (supplying smallholder tea growers with fertilizer), the sugarcane 
outgrower programs in Western Kenya (there are roughly 4-5 big sugar companies each 
operating their outgrower programs), and the hitherto strong coffee cooperative organization 
that supplied inputs to its members across the country.  
 
 
For sugarcane the study will disaggregate this system into two geographic areas with 
differing success in fertilizer use and elucidate the reasons for this.  For smallholder tea 
farmers, Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), a farmer-owned entity but with strong 
government control, supplies fertilizer and recoups its loans from selling tea leaves which it 
does on behalf of farmers.  Many smallholder farmers in coffee growing areas receive 
fertilizer through coffee cooperatives who acquire the input through commercial importers.  
These sub-systems are interlinked in the sense that input loans are recouped by the 
cooperative upon the sale of coffee cherry delivered by farmers to the cooperatives.  Our 
study disaggregates this cooperative channel according to how well it is working in different 
areas in Kenya and reasons for this.  Many coffee cooperatives have in recent years become 





                                                 
6 The Ministry of Co-operatives, with support from the Nordic funded Co-operative Merchandise 
Project in the early 1990s, tried to promote the cooperatives’ input procurement and distribution 
capacity.  This was done by facilitating ease of credit acquisition from the co-operative bank.  
However, most unions could not meet repayment obligations and hence the scheme collapsed.  
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4.2   Open Market Commercial Fertilizer Sub-Systems  
 
This channel includes “independent” (no clearly discernible government intervention) 
commercial dealers or traders who sell fertilizer to willing buyers, mostly on cash basis.  As 
reported earlier, an IFDC study states that by 1996 there were 12 major importers, 500 
wholesalers, and roughly 5000 retailers distributing fertilizer in the country (Allgood and 
Kilungo, 1996).
7  The IFDC (2001) estimates that the number of retailers rose to about 8,000 
by 2000.  This sub-system has grown substantially since the liberalization of the fertilizer 
sub-sector in 1990.  This un-integrated system supplies most of the fertilizer used by small 
farmers on maize and horticultural crops (fresh fruits and vegetables).  Within this system 
large floriculture and horticulture farms place tenders for supply of fertilizer for their own 
use.  
 
The Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), a private-sector organization, dominated fertilizer 
wholesaling and retailing in Kenya before liberalization with 69 distribution outlets in the 
country dealing with 50 percent of the Government fertilizer (largely donated by external 
donors).  The government handled all importation of fertilizer prior to liberalization, much of 
which was donated by external donors.  During this period the KFA enjoyed limited 
competition in wholesaling and retailing, yet its activities were constrained by fertilizer price 
controls that discouraged distribution to remote areas, import licensing quotas, and foreign 
exchange controls.  Rent seeking was a common feature in this trade and partially contributed 
to late fertilizer deliveries to farmers resulting in low fertilizer use.  After liberalization of the 
sub-sector, the giant company has faltered under the strain of increased competition.  There 
are indications that the KFA is trying to revive its fertilizer distribution operations.  
 
Most available studies indicate that the market is generally competitive, particularly at the 
retail level (Arwings-Kodhek, 1996; Omamo and Mose, 2001; Wanzala et al., 2002; Jayne et 
al., 2003; Omamo and Wanzala, 2004).  Freeman and Omiti (2003) conclude that market 
reform has stimulated fertilizer use by small farmers in Kenya, mainly by improving farmers’ 
access to the input through the expansion of private retail networks.  
 
A third type of fertilizer distribution channel – food marketing parastatals providing 
subsidized fertilizer or credit for the purchase of fertilizer – has been of marginal importance 
in Kenya since 1990, in contrast to the situation in many other African countries.  During the 
early 1990s, the government handled donor-supported fertilizer imports, and sold it usually to 
other private wholesalers.  The volume of donated fertilizer handled by government has 
declined from about 50% of total imports in 1990 to virtually nil by 1996 (see Figure 1).  
However, the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) has recently begun to distribute 
small amounts of fertilizer, 17,000 and 30,000 tons in 2004 and 2005, respectively.   
Ostensibly, the NCPB’s entry into the fertilizer market is due to concerns about the 
competitiveness of the private fertilizer delivery systems.  However, nationwide surveys of 
1,364 small farm households implemented by the Tegemeo Institute in 1997, 2000, and 2004 
indicate that less than 1% of small-scale farmers surveyed obtained fertilizer from 
government parastatals other than tea farmers through the KTDA.  Also, the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC) has, over the past decade, focused its credit operations almost 
exclusively on large-scale and medium-scale farmers cultivating over 10 hectares.  The AFC 
                                                 
7 Some analysts note that, given the current volume of imports, there is little room for 10-11 
importing firms to operate efficiently, and that some shake-out is likely to occur unless import 
volumes continue to climb substantially (e.g., Global Development Solutions, 2005).    12
and NCPB have played a very marginal role in providing fertilizer (or credit for fertilizer) 
since 1990 in Kenya.   
 
Therefore, the fertilizer distributed to small farmers since 1990 has been almost exclusively 
through the first two types of channels:  the interlinked commodity-based programs (e.g., tea, 
coffee, sugar), and the un-integrated system of independent importers, wholesalers, and 
retailers operating on a cash basis.  These are the fertilizer delivery channels that will be 
specifically analyzed in later sections of the report, in terms of trends in fertilizer usage 
through these various channels.  
 
5.   Household-Level Fertilizer Use Patterns  
 
This section explores the sources of the growth in fertilizer use over the last decade using 
household panel survey data from Tegemeo Institute Surveys.  Panel survey data on 1,364 
small-scale households covering 24 districts in Kenya indicate a substantial increase in 
fertilizer consumption from 1995/96 to 1996/97 and 1999/00 season, followed by a modest 
decline between the 1999/00 and 2003/04 seasons (Table 7).  This pattern mirrors the pattern 
shown in the national fertilizer use estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture, i.e., a small 
increase between the 1995/96 and 1996/97 seasons, followed by a major increase from 
1996/97 to 1999/00, followed by a slight decline from 1999/00 to 2003/04.  Both the 
Tegemeo data and the national Ministry of Agriculture figures indicate an overall pattern of 
fertilizer consumption growth over the past decade (see Appendix 1 for full Ministry of 
Agriculture estimates from 1990/91 to 2004/05).  Small-scale farmers’ use of fertilizer in the 
2003/04 Tegemeo survey was almost twice as great as it was in the 1996/97 survey. 
 
TABLE 7. FERTILIZER USAGE, TEGEMEO NATIONWIDE HOUSEHOLD 
SURVEYS AND NATIONAL MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE ESTIMATES 
 
Year Tegemeo  Household  Surveys 
(tons) 
(a) 




1995/96 225  289 
1996/97 237  249 
1999/00 447  336 
2003/04 424  313 
Source:  column (a):  Tegemeo Institute/MSU Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis 
Household Surveys, 1996/97 and 1999/00, and 2003/04.  Column (b):  Ministry of Agriculture, data 
reproduced from Table 5. 
 
 
The fairly high correspondence between the Tegemeo small-scale farm surveys and the 
national Ministry of Agriculture data suggests that the increased consumption of fertilizer in 
Kenya, as shown in the data presented in Table 7, can be attributed to some degree to 
increased fertilizer consumption on small-scale farms.  In fact, the Tegemeo data indicate that 
the trend growth in smallholder fertilizer consumption could possibly have been greater than 
that of national consumption (which includes large-scale and estate farms).  
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Further evidence in support of increased smallholder use of fertilizer comes from the earlier 
inspection of the types of fertilizers accounting for the overall rise in fertilizer consumption in 
Kenya.   As discussed in Section 4 and later in Section 7, tea, sugarcane, maize, and 
horticultural crops have accounted for most of the rise in fertilizer use in Kenya in the past 
decade.   Tea, sugarcane, and horticultural crops have also accounted for increased cultivation 
by the small-scale farm sector in Kenya (Economic Survey, 2004).  While these crops are 
also grown by large-scale farmers and estates, it is on a much more limited scale.  And 
interviews with fertilizer importing firms exclusively serving smallholder farmers (e.g., 
KTDA) indicate a major increase in fertilizer importation in recent years, confirming at least 
in the case of tea that the rising consumption of tea fertilizers has reflected increased use by 
smallholder farmers (see Section 7 for further details on tea). 
 
 
5.1   Crops Accounting for Increased Use of Fertilizer  
 
Kenya possesses great agro-ecological heterogeneity.  While its highland areas are generally 
suitable for cultivation and are close to urban markets, many parts of the country are semi-
arid.  While crop production is still important in these areas (e.g., eastern lowlands, coastal 
areas, western lowlands), the profitability of fertilizer use is not clearly established in most of 
these semi-arid areas.  The lack of irrigation potential and variability of rainfall in most semi-
arid parts of the country drive down the farm-level profitability of fertilizer for farmers in 
these areas.  Hence, although the percentage of small farm households using fertilizer 
nationwide has, according to the Tegemeo surveys, varied from 43% of small-scale 
households in 1995/96, to 51% in 1996/97, to 69% in 2003/04, these rates vary considerably 
throughout the country, ranging from less than 10% of households surveyed in the drier 
lowland areas to over 85% of small farmers in Central Province and the High-Potential Maize 
Zones of the North Rift (Table 8).  
 
Table 8 also shows that the largest increases in the proportion of households using fertilizer 
occurred in areas of fairly high agro-ecological potential.  Between the 1996/97 and 2003/04 
seasons, the proportion of households using fertilizer rose from 57% to 74% in the Western 
Highlands (Vihiga and Kisii districts), from 69% to 90% in the High-Potential Maize Zone 
(Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, and Lugari districts), and from 32% to 61% in the Western 
Transitional Zone (Kakamega and Bungoma districts).  By contrast, the proportion of 
households using fertilizer in the Coastal Lowlands and Western Lowlands/Nyanza areas has 
stagnated at 6% percent and 8%, respectively.  However, there has been considerable growth 
in fertilizer use in the semi-arid Eastern Lowlands Zone (Machakos, Mwingi, and Kitui 
districts) from 30% to 46% of survey households between 1996/97 and 2003/04.   14
 
TABLE 8. PERCENT OF SMALL-SCALE HOUSEHOLDS USING FERTILIZER, BY 
REGION AND CROP YEAR (1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/00, 2003/04) 
Region of Kenya  1995/96  1996/97  1999/00  2003/04 
Coastal  Lowlands  2% 3%  5% 6% 
Eastern  Lowlands  19% 30%  37% 46% 
Western  Lowlands  2% 3%  4% 8% 
Western Transitional  29% 32%  59% 61% 
High Potential Maize Zone  67%  69%  86%  90% 
Western Highlands  52% 57%  73% 74% 
Central  Highlands  63% 78%  90% 93% 
Marginal Rain Shadow  12%  20%  22%  27% 
Nationwide Sample  43%  51% 64%  69% 
Source: Tegemeo Institute/MSU Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis Household Surveys of 
1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/00, and 2003/04. 
 
 
When considering the proportion of small-scale households using fertilizer today compared 
to potential use, it is important to take account of the number of households that cannot at 
present time use fertilizer profitably.  Since fertilizer use has limited potential in the coastal 
and western lowlands without irrigation potential, it is likely that the potential for profitable 
use of fertilizer nationwide would not exceed 75 to 85 percent of small-scale households at 
most.  If these estimates are roughly accurate, then according to the Tegemeo surveys, about 
81 to 92 percent of the small-scale farmers nationwide who could be profitably using 
fertilizer were in fact using fertilizer in 2003/04.
8 
 
By disaggregating households’ fertilizer use patterns by zone and by crop (Tables 9-15), it 
can be seen that much of the increased use of fertilizer between the 1996/97 season and the 
two subsequent seasons is due to increased consumption in four areas:  (1) the main maize-
producing areas of the country (North Rift Valley), primarily due to increased use of top-
dressing fertilizer; (2) other areas where inter-crop maize is prominent, such as in the 
Western Highlands areas of Vihiga and Kisii, and the Central Highlands areas; (3) the 
Kakamega and Bungoma areas where fertilizer is mainly used on sugarcane obtained through 
sugar outgrower arrangements; and (4) the Central and Western Highlands regions where the 
observed increase in tea fertilizers through the KTDA distribution system has been used.  
 
The findings are consistent with national import and consumption figures for certain sub-
sectors of the Kenya economy. Fertilizer application/usage in tea, sugar, and maize has gone 
up. Tegemeo panel data shows a general increase in area under fertilizer for these crops 
(Section 7). Tea in particular has had increased growth in NPK usage due to area expansion, 
reflecting new smallholders entering into tea production and some expansion by existing tea 
producers, as well as increased application of fertilizer.  This conclusion is corroborated by 
information received from KTDA, which will be discussed later.  Expansion of tea acreage is 
largely attributed to the relatively higher international prices that have been passed along to 
tea growers through the KTDA. 
 
                                                 
8 e.g., if the total small-farm population in Kenya that could be using fertilizer profitably in most seasons 
were 75%, and the Tegemeo surveys indicate that 69% are already using, then 69/75=92%.  Analogously, 
69/85=81%.    15
 
TABLE 9. DOSE RATES AND PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS APPLYING 
FERTILIZER FOR DIFFERENT CROP AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS 
 1995/96  1996/97  1999/00  2003/04 
Coffee        
  kgs/acre cultivated (users only)  157  170  265  214 
  % households using fertilizer  41%  46%  56%  49% 
Sugar        
  kgs/acre cultivated (users only)  Na  115  197  142 
  % households using fertilizer  34%  30%  51%  48% 
Tea        
  kgs/acre cultivated (users only)  326  326  344  387 
  % households using fertilizer  85%  84%  92%  92% 
        
Mono-Crop Maize         
  kgs/acre cultivated (users only)  59  69  72  67 
  % households using fertilizer  47%  47%  50%  59% 
Inter-Crop Maize         
  kgs/acre cultivated (users only)  57  59  62  66 
  % households using fertilizer  55%  56%  63%  66% 
Source: Tegemeo Institute/MSU Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis Household Surveys of 
1995/96, 1996/97, 1999/00, and 2003/04 for 1320 households. 
 
 
By contrast, fertilizer use on coffee has stagnated (more details are in Section 7).  The decline 
in performance of the integrated cooperative credit-input-output coffee marketing system has 
resulted in reduced coffee cultivation, and a lower percentage of area applied to fertilizer as 
farmers see lower returns to increased use of fertilizer. The number of households applying 
fertilizer has stagnated at around the 1997 levels of 46%, although mean fertilizer application 
per acre has risen sharply in 2003/04.  The collapse of some coffee cooperatives / unions has 
disrupted the economies of scale resulting from joint acquisitions of fertilizers by most 
farmers to a system where individual societies are sourcing from private 
importers/wholesalers or even farmers sourcing directly from retailers. 
 
Table 10a, 10b and 10c provide a more detailed picture of fertilizer use patterns on maize 
across the distribution of farmers by region.  This table is constructed by first ranking all 
households growing maize according to their intensity of fertilizer application (kgs per acre) 
on maize.  We then report the level of fertilizer applied per acre of maize grown (monocrop 





th percentiles of the distribution.  
Here is an example for interpreting the tables.  In 1996/97 in the High-Potential Maize Zone, 
10% of the households used less than 1.89kgs per acre of maize while 90% used more than 
this; 25% of the farmers used 32.19 kgs per acre, while 75% used more than this; the median 
fertilizer use on maize was 50kgs per acre; 75% of the farmers used less than 68.47kgs per 
acre while 25% used more than this; and 90% of the farmers in this zone used less than 
124.11kgs per acre, while 10% used more than this.   
 
What is clear from Tables 10a, 10b, and 10c is that an increasing proportion of small farmers 
in Kenya are applying fertilizer on maize, and that the mean dose rates (kgs per acre) are 
increasing as well, often substantially.  Fertilizer use remains low in the semi-arid parts of the   16
country.  These areas (Coastal Lowlands, Western Lowlands, and the Marginal Rain 
Shadow/Laikipia) are unshaded in Table 10.  By contrast, there has been a major increase in 
the proportion of households using fertilizer on maize in the other zones – Western 
Transitional (lower elevation areas of Bungoma and Kakamega districts), the High-Potential 
Maize Zone (upper elevation areas of Kakamega, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Bomet, and 
Nakuru districts), and the Western Highlands (Vihiga and Kisii).  It is also noted that a larger 
proportion of households over time are applying greater levels of fertilizer on maize in these 
areas.  Taking the Western Transitional Zone as an example, whereas the median use of 
fertilizer on maize was only 4.5kgs per acre in 1996/97, this rose to 16.7 kgs per acre in 
1999/00 and 29.7 kgs per acre in 2003/04.  
 
Table 11 summarizes mean household fertilizer use intensity, for those using fertilizer, for all 
regions and crops, by year.  Note that the fertilizer use figures are in kilograms per hectare 
(not acres), to provide easier comparisons with figures in other countries where hectares are 
more commonly used as the unit of land cultivation.  The figures show that, for maize, 
fertilizer use rates are comparable to, or exceed, fertilizer use rates in many parts of Asia and 
Latin America, where “green revolutions” have been widely cited to have occurred.  In 
Kenya’s case, these fertilizer use rates on maize have been achieved largely under dry land 
conditions (in contrast to much of Asia’s irrigated land advantage), and where maize 
marketing conditions have been problematic and subject to considerable policy uncertainty.   
 
Table 11 also shows the following:  For mono-crop maize, the level of fertilizer use (among 
those households using fertilizer) has risen in the Eastern Lowlands and the Western 
Transitional Zone, while it has fallen in the Central Highlands.  Fertilizer use per hectare on 
inter-cropped maize has risen in the Eastern Lowlands, the Western Transitional Zone 
(Bungoma and lower Kakamega), the High-Potential Maize Zone, and Western Highlands 
(Vihiga and Kisii).  The percentages of farmers using fertilizer on tea and the amount of tea 
area have both risen.  Fertilizer dose rates on sugarcane have risen in the Western 
Transitional Zone, but remain stagnant in the Western Lowlands.  Fertilizer dose rates on 
coffee has declined sharply in the Eastern Lowlands, declined moderately in the Central 
Highlands, but risen in the Western Highlands.  Lastly, the mean level of fertilizer use on 
horticultural crops has increased in the Western Transition and Western Highlands Zone as 
well as the Central Highlands.  Over the nationwide sample, among households using 
fertilizer, there has been roughly a 10% increase in the mean level of fertilizer use per hectare 
cropped. 
 
5.2 Is Fertilizer Mainly Being Used by Larger Farms?   
 
Policy makers in Kenya and in most African countries are concerned not only with the 
absolute use of fertilizer but also who is able to use it.  In particular, there are concerns that 
while fertilizer may be affordable for large farmers, fertilizer costs are beyond the reach of 
most small farmers cropping 2 hectares or less. 
 
To examine this issue, we plotted all 1,364 households according to their fertilizer application 
per unit of cropped land and the number of acres under cultivation (Figure 2).  The results 
show that the highest levels of fertilizer use per acre are among the small farms, although 
    18
 


















National  Kgs/acre on maize 
plots for farms 
ranked by fertilizer 
use intensity 
Fertilizer kgs/acre on maize plots (both mono and intercropped) 
10
th  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.89 0.00 4.43 0.00 0.00 
25th  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.19 7.71  20.71 0.00  0.00 
50th  0.00 0.00 0.00 4.50 50.00 17.51 41.81 0.00  14.44 
75th  0.00 2.11 0.00 32.29  68.47 32.69 79.12 0.00  42.95 



















National  Kgs/acre on maize 
plots for farms 
ranked by fertilizer 
use intensity 
Fertilizer kgs/acre on maize plots (both mono and intercropped) 
10
th  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.54 0.77 5.85 0.00 .00 
25th  0.00 0.00 0.00 2.72 33.10 10.58 25.63 0.00  1.66 
50th  0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67  50.00 22.67 44.14 0.00  17.39 
75th  0.00 2.75 0.00 42.30  72.58 36.71 72.30 0.00  46.44 



















National  Kgs/acre on maize 
plots for farms 
ranked by fertilizer 
use intensity 
Fertilizer kgs/acre on maize plots (both mono and intercropped) 
10
th  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.81 4.37 4.33 0.00 0.00 
25th  0.00 0.00 0.00 7.66 35.80 18.66 22.17 0.00  3.90 
50th  0.00 1.61 0.00 29.67  52.05 29.51 41.44 0.00  20.94 
75th  0.00 6.30 0.00 62.31  90.98 50.88 70.53 0.00  51.48 
90th  2.85 28.34  9.57 117.95  147.70 108.28 246.09 43.04  137.81 
Source:  Tegemeo Institute/Egerton University/MSU rural farm household surveys, 1997, 2000, and 2004. 
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96/97  - 11.8  5.0 60.7  224.9  52.0  128.0  - 154.8 
99/00  - 9.3  -  68.6  231.7  50.0  186.8  2.5  167.7 
Maize 
Mono 
  03/04  0.1 48.3 -  104.7 232.6 54.8  87.1 -  153.4 
96/97  - 2.2  7.3 62.6  143.8  60.8 128.4 1.2  67.4 
99/00  2.6 5.5  4.1  78.4  176.7 62.5  92.8 1.8 69.1 
Maize 
Intercrop 
03/04  - 12.3  2.3 118.9  189.0  101.8 129.5  0.2  98.4 
96/97  - -  -  -  692.5  338.5  876.5  - 761.5 
99/00  - -  -  -  511.9  685.0  920.7  - 760.0  Tea 
03/04  - -  -  -  619.8  663.0  751.7  - 702.3 
96/97  - -  15.4  79.4  26.7  -  -  - 68.8 
99/00  - -  4.4 210.8  -  -  -  - 157.8  Sugar 
03/04  - -  13.9  172.9  -  -  -  - 134.7 
96/97  - 154.9  -  -  21.9  22.7  273.5  - 175.1 
99/00  - 102.9  -  -  85.6  39.0  353.7  - 213.0  Coffee 
03/04  - 22.6  -  -  21.0  72.8  252.4  - 181.4 
96/97  4.0 32.4 17.8  50.2  79.2 56.4  96.9  98.3  51.5 
99/00  0.0 6.0  0.2  96.1  140.2 67.0  190.8  2.8 71.9  Horticulture 
03/04  0.8 9.7  7.4  68.4  115.7 93.2  219.0  32.2  73.7 
96/97  2.8 25.5 9.5  69.4  160.6 74.2  210.9  26.7  93.9 
99/00  0.2 6.8  1.2  116.4 158.7 78.5  238.2  2.6 88.9 
All Crops 
 
03/04  0.7 11.5 5.5  114.4 164.5 117.1  256.7  24.1  102.1 
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approximately 40% of farms under 2 acres use no fertilizer.  Overall, the bivariate regression 
slope is almost flat throughout the country, indicating that fertilizer use intensity is roughly 
constant among small and large farms.   
 
However, we also find that households not using fertilizer in any of the four survey periods 
do tend to have lower incomes (mean of Kshs 27,268 per households in 2004) than 
households using fertilizer consistently in all survey periods (Kshs 44,711 per household in 
2004).  This does suggest that poverty is an important constraint on fertilizer use, and that 
viable financing arrangements will be needed to stimulate fertilizer use by poor households to 
achieve broad-based rural productivity growth.   
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Source: Tegemeo/MSU Household Survey 2003/04
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5.3 Effect of Wealth on Fertilizer use and Access to Credit 
 
One key issue that will help inform policy on the necessity for fertilizer subsidies to poor 
households is the connection between fertilizer intensity and wealth levels. If fertilizer 
application rates are positively correlated with wealth then there is a case for public 
intervention to help poor households apply more fertilizer per unit area through subsidies if 
there is no better alternative to achieve increased doses. In addition, if fertilizer credit is 
mostly available to wealthy households then one can argue for some targeted provision of 
credit to poorer households who will otherwise have little access to formal credit. Clustering 
the Tegemeo/MSU sample data into three wealth groups gives interesting insights into the 
relationship between wealth and the intensity of fertilizer use and access to credit for 
purchase of fertilizer.  
 
For these purpose, the Tegemeo/MSU panel data was clustered into three groups each with 
approximately 440 households based on wealth ranging from poor, fairly poor to richer 
households for the years 1997, 2000, and 2004 as shown in Table 12. Table 12a and 12b 
shows the households, both in absolute numbers and percentages within each group, growing 
the different crops. More that 95 percent of the households grow maize intercrop or 
horticulture
9 while less that 20 percent grow sugar or tea.  Approximately one quarter of the 
households grow maize as a monocrop while less than a third grows maize monocrop or 
coffee. This is an important indicator of risk management by these households faced with 
demand and supply-based shocks. Table 12b bolsters this conclusion by showing that the 
percentage of households growing maize as a monocrop continued to decline from 1997 to 
2004 while the percentage of households intercropping maize increased in the same period. 
One other item of interest is the decline in the number of households growing coffee over this 
period; as shown in previous sections coffee has faced unreliable prices in the last few years 
coupled with mismanagement of farmer cooperative organizations.  
 
Table 12c shows that only 0.7% of maize intercrop growers received credit for purchasing 
fertilizer compare to approximately 30% (coffee), 40% (sugar), 80% (tea), and 1-2% 
(horticulture).  Excluding tea, the percentage of households receiving fertilizer credit declined 
between 2000 and 2004. For maize and coffee, there was a relatively higher percentage of 
credit recipients in the richer group compared to the other groups. For maize monocrop 1.3% 
of growers in the richer group received fertilizer credit while none received in the lower 
wealth terciles. For coffee, the poor tercile had 20% (2000) and 17% (2004) of growers 
receiving credit compared to 41% (2000) and 31% (2004) for the richer group. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Maize intercrop includes all fields planted with maize and mostly horticulture crops (other crops too but excluding 
intercrops with horticulture and tea, coffee, or sugar). For the purpose of this analysis” horticulture” includes all fields 
containing horticulture crops (vegetables and fruits) but excluding those fields with horticulture and maize, tea, coffee, or 
sugar.   22
TABLE 12: STATISTICS ON FERTILIZER USE AND CREDIT ACROSS WEALTH TERCILES BY CROP (1997, 2000, 2004) 
 
a)  Number of Households Growing Crop
10 
 Maize  (Intercrop)  Maize ( Monocrop)  Coffee  Sugar  Tea  Horticulture 
Year  1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 
POOREST  398  428  431  104  71 46 86 89 92 59 63 66 43 30 42 276  431  437 
MIDDLE  394 435 429 100 83  71  105 135 120 68  49  49  64  77  84  296 431 436 
RICHEST  377  417  426  114  96 79 68 86 73 43 50 51 67 74 76 282  431  436 
b)  Percentage of Households in Tercile Growing Crop 
 Maize  (Intercrop)  Maize ( Monocrop)  Coffee  Sugar  Tea  Horticulture 
POOREST  90% 97% 98% 24% 16% 10% 20% 20% 21% 13% 14% 15% 10% 7%  10% 63% 98% 99% 
MIDDLE  90% 99% 98% 23% 19% 16% 24% 31% 27% 15% 11% 11% 15% 18% 19% 67% 98% 99% 
RICHEST  86% 95% 97% 26% 22% 18% 15% 20% 17% 10% 11% 12% 15% 17% 17% 64% 98% 99% 
c)  Percentage of Growers Getting Fertilizer Credit by Tercile 
  Maize (Intercrop)  Maize (Monocrop) Coffee  Sugar  Tea  Horticulture 
Year  1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 
POOREST  NA 0.7%  0.7%        NA 20%  17%  NA 49%  39%  NA 80%  77%  NA 0% 0% 
MIDDLE  NA 0.7%  0.2%        NA 34%  25%  NA 45%  37%  NA 73%  83%  NA 1% 1% 
RICHEST  NA 0.7%  0.9%      1.3%  NA 41%  31%  NA 40%  39%  NA 74%  88%  NA 3% 3% 
d)  Percentage of Growers Using Fertilizer by Tercile 
 Maize  (Intercrop)  Maize ( Monocrop)  Coffee  Sugar  Tea  Horticulture 
POOREST  42% 47% 51% 34% 27% 26% 40% 52% 42% 37% 54% 52% 77% 90% 86% 36% 43% 44% 
MIDDLE  61% 69% 73% 50% 54% 66% 42% 57% 53% 28% 47% 41% 83% 90% 90% 47% 66% 67% 
RICHEST  66% 73% 75% 58% 63% 71% 59% 58% 53% 23% 52% 49% 90% 96% 96% 46% 66% 61% 
e)  Fertilizer Intensity (Kgs/Acre) by Tercile 
 Maize  (Intercrop)  Maize ( Monocrop)  Coffee  Sugar  Tea  Horticulture 
POOREST  45  55  52  67  41  56  131 164 178 143 252 156 369 351 384 67  112 98 
MIDDLE  59  66  62  71  87  64  172 243 183 97  208 143 402 367 385 88  167 121 
RICHEST  70  73  81  68  72  72  202 390 302 87  117 123 387 385 400 93  144 127 
 
Source: Tegemeo/MSU Household Panel Data for 1997, 2000, 2004
                                                 
10 The analysis is based on a total of 1320 households that were interviewed in all the three years. Each tercile / wealth group consists of 440 households (thus the three groups sum up to 1320 households). It  does 
not necessarily follow that the number of households growing a particular crop is the same as the total households in the group (440) e.g less than 70 households out of 440 in each of the three groups  grow sugar.    23
 
Table 12d gives important indicators of the percentage of growers using fertilizer for each 
crop. It is noteworthy that it is only in maize and horticulture (and for some tea groups), that 
the percentage of fertilizer users has increased with wealth and across time as well. This 
dovetails with earlier evidence adducing, in part, increased use of fertilizer in Kenya to 
farmers growing these crops. For instance, in 2004 the poorest groups had 51% (maize 
intercrop), 26% (maize monocrop), 42% (coffee), 86% (tea), and 44 % (horticulture) of the 
households using fertilizer compared to 75%, 71%, 53%, 96%, and 61% for the richest 
groups of same crops respectively. The largest increase in the percent of growers for maize 
intercrop and monocrop between 2000 and 2004 occurred in poorest group for maize 
intercrop (47% to 51%) and the richest group for monocrop maize (63% to 71%). For the 
same period, the poorest tercile in coffee had a 10% drop in those using fertilizer while 
richest had a drop of 5% while sugar had an approximate drop of 3% in all categories.  
 
Finally Table 12e reveals interesting results on fertilizer dose rates across the panel by type of 
crop. First, except for sugar, there is a general increase in fertilizer intensity or application 
rates per acre as wealth increases. This has implications for policy, suggesting the possibility 
that subsidies appropriately targeted at the poor might raise dose rates for this group. It is 
only in tea that growers in all categories of wealth raised the dosage of fertilizer use between 
2000 and 2004 though there was a decline from 1997 to 2000. Figure 9 and Table 18 in 
Section 7.3 offer explanations for this result. The poorest and middle category of households 
growing maize intercrop decreased the intensity during the panel period while the richest 
increased their intensity over the same period.  
 
TABLE 13. SOURCES OF FERTILIZER CREDIT FOR DIFFERENT CROPS* (2000 
AND 2004) 




Coffee Sugar  Tea  Horticulture 
  2000  2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)  1  2     1                       
Coffee Co-operative          99  67              
Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA)                   135  168     
Sugar Company              73  57           
Local Private Trader                           4  1 
Large Company                         7  7 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)                           2    
Informal Money Lender    3                       3   
Friend/Relative  5  3                          
TOTALS  6  8  0  1  99 67 73 57 135  168  16 8 
Source: Tegemeo/MSU Household Panel Data for 1997, 2000, and 2004. *This table includes only those growing the crop 
and receiving fertilizer credit (not the whole sample). 
 
 
It is important to identify the sources of fertilizer credit for the different crops and how these 
vary across wealth levels. Table 13 gives information on the number of those growing the 
different crops (not entire sample) receiving fertilizer credit and the sources of this credit.  
Approximately 93 percent of those who received fertilizer credit sourced funds from input-
output-credit interlinked suppliers like KTDA, Coffee Coops, and Sugar Companies.  For the 
panel period 2000 to 2004, on average about 48 percent of the credit recipients were tea 
growers, 26 percent were coffee growers, 20 percent were sugar growers, 3.7 percent   24
horticulture growers, and 2.4 percent maize growers. Arguably, Agricultural Finance 
Corporation provided most of its services to large farmers (outside of Tegemeo sample); the 
AFC extended credit to insignificant number of smallholder farmers represented by the 
Tegemeo sample. The rest of the formal lenders gave credit to horticulture growers while 
maize received credit from friends/relatives or informal sector. 
 
TABLE 14. SOURCES OF FERTILIZER CREDIT BY ASSET GROUP (2000 AND 
2004) FOR ALL CROPS 
 POOREST  MIDDLE  RICHEST  TOTALS 
 2000  2004  2000  2004  2000  2004  2000  2004 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)        1        3  1  3 
Coffee Co-operative  18  18  46  28  35  21  99  67 
Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA)  24  34  56  71  55  63  135  168 
Sugar Company  31  27  22  23  20  7  73  57 
Local Private Trader  2    1     2     5  0 
Large Company     1  1     8  4  9  5 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)              2     2  0 
Informal Money Lender  1  2     1  2     3  3 
Friend/Relative 2  1  2      1  2  5  3 
TOTALS 78  83  129  123  125  100  332  306 
 
In 2000, 23% of recipients were from the poorest group and this increased to 27% in 2004 
while that for the middle and upper group declined from 77% to 73% of all recipients
11. Only 
the proportion of recipients sourcing from KTDA increased significantly between 2000 and 
2004 from 41% to 55% while for coffee this declined from 30% to 22% and sugar from 22% 
to 19% of recipients in the period. From Table 14, the KTDA, Coffee Coops, and Sugar 
Companies who are the main formal credit sources lend to the wealthier households in our 
sample (as evidenced by Tables 12c, 13 and 14). 
 
To further clarify the relationship between total household fertilizer use and intensity and 
wealth levels we use locally weighted techniques to express these relationships by charts. 
Figures 3a shows that in general wealthier households purchase more fertilizer, holding other 
factors constant. Using semi-parametric procedures Figure 3 indicates that total household 
fertilizer consumption (for all crops) increases slightly as wealth increases. Figure 4 
disaggregates the results by crop to examine crop-specific relationships between fertilizer use 
per acre and household wealth.  While it is often generalized that fertilizer use is strongly 
correlated with household wealth, the picture that emerges from the nationwide survey data is 
not so clear.  For some crops, like coffee, there is a slight positive correlation between the kgs 
of fertilizer applied per acre of coffee and household wealth.   However, for all other crops, 
the bivariate relationship between is virtually flat, indicating that the intensity of fertilizer use 
among small-scale farmers is rough constant across wealth groups.  However, wealthier 
households tend to have more land, and hence the total amount of fertilizer used per 
household is indeed positively correlated with wealth.   
                                                 
11 Table 14 needs some caveat because of the potential confusion that might crop up with what has been discussed 
above particularly under Table 12c.Table 14 does not disaggregate recipients of credit into growers of certain crops but deals 
with totals. What follows will be a discussion on proportions revolving around total recipients without regard to number of 
growers. Note that the percentages given here might change significantly when compared to number of growers (which has 
been covered under Table 12c). For example an increase in the proportion of  poor recipients (as a percent of all recipients) 
from 23% to 27%  will translate to different percentages when dealing with percent of poor growers who received credit 
since the absolute number of poor households might be large compared to rich households.   25
 
 
FIGURE 3.  FERTILIZER USE AMONG SMALLHOLDERS BY HOUSEHOLD 
ASSETS (1997, 2000, AND 2004 COMBINED) 
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FIGURE 4. INTENSITY OF FERTILIZER USE BY HOUSEHOLD ASSETS, 
SMALLHOLDER FARMS, 1997, 2000 AND 2004 
 
 





6.  Trends in Fertilizer Prices and Marketing Margins  
 
6.1 Financial Cost Accounting of Fertilizer Prices in Kenya 
 
There are two major cost components in fertilizer trade comprising of foreign and domestic 
portions (Table 15). The domestic retail fertilizer prices are directly dependent on 
international FOB prices as well as freight, insurance, and financing/ administration costs.  
Fertilizer prices also vary according to the domestic transport, warehousing and allied 
administrative costs.  These are usually paid in foreign currency implying the exchange rate 
prevailing at the time of transaction plays a crucial role.  
 
Domestic costs include transportation costs which include costs for domestic transport from 
warehouses Ex-Mombasa to point of destination. There are two modes of transport used in 
Kenya, road and rail. Of the two roads transport has the larger share due to its flexibility in 
terms of pricing and delivery. However it is still not convenient for bulk cargo and is more 
open to transit losses unlike rail haulage. 
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Warehousing is a crucial part pf the process of moving fertilizers from Mombasa to 
destinations. Due to bulky nature of fertilizer, it is necessary to store at all levels of 
distribution. These costs become critical where fertilizer lands after planting or topdressing, 
necessitating storage to next season in this case they would form a large part of costs.  
 
TABLE 15. CAN COST COMPONENTS 
2005-CAN  $/ton % of Farm gate
FOB Eastern Europe  165 52.97%
Shipping to Mombasa  35 11.24%
Port Charges  46 14.77%
Into Warehouse  2 0.64%
Inland Transport, transit losses and firm mark-ups  63.5 20.39%
Farm gate (Nakuru)  311.5 100%
  
 
Closely related to warehousing are the financial costs that would cover interest between 
purchase and sale of the fertilizer. Handling costs are incurred in loading and off loading at 
various stages, usually form a small part of costs.  Appendix 4 and 5 (CAN and DAP cost 
breakdown) supply more details on how these costs build up all the way to the retail market 
of Nakuru from international sources.  
 
Some areas that need further policy attention to help reduce costs of fertilizer include delayed 
clearance at port (few handlers and companies are allowed to use their own workers), double 
handling at port (within and without port re-bagging and handling), and a lot of paperwork in 
releasing documents.  A rough estimation indicates that the FOB price for DAP is 
approximately 50% of the farm gate price at inland Nakuru and the CIF (cost, insurance, and 
freight) is about 69% of Nakuru prices.  This implies that shipping, port costs, and Kenyan 
government levies of various types (shown in Appendix 4 and 5) account for 19% of the price 
of fertilizer in Western Kenya, while upland transport, handling, transit losses, and mark-up 
margins account for around 31% of the Western Kenya retail prices. 
 
Some of the risks for importers involve price fluctuations that necessitate close monitoring of 
markets. The timing of delivery is very important too. Delivering or making orders too early 
means storage costs will escalate.  To some extent, firms have become more efficient in this 
respect and marketing margins have fallen accordingly.  But delivering late also entails a 
financial cost associated with missed opportunities for sales; getting fertilizer too late runs the 
risk of competitors snatching most of their market.  So, firms’ ability to import closer to 
planting time without losing retail customers signifies some deepening of importer-
wholesale-retail supply chain relationships that comes with the maturation of a market.  
 
Most of the private traders use commercial banks for loans or letters of credit locally or 
abroad.  Unlike state-sponsored corporations these are not subsidized but face market prices. 
Most of the importers in the private sector have financing arrangements in sourcing the 
fertilizer or selling it to wholesalers or retailers. Sales are in a combination of cash and credit 
depending on particular needs or circumstances. When credit is usually extended to 
customer-wholesalers it is against a post-dated check to guarantee payments. However, even 
this is not foolproof as some defaults do occur.  Since importers are not credit bureaus and   28
have no information on creditworthiness of potential customers, they are willing to supply 
fertilizer on credit so long as a credible bank makes the arrangement with the customer. 
 
 
6.2 Trends in Domestic Fertilizer Marketing Margins 
 
Trends in fertilizer prices and domestic marketing margins are important indicators of market 
performance.  Estimating costs is difficult because some cost items are difficult to collect 
with accuracy as it requires disaggregating fertilizer-related overhead costs as distinct from 
other activities carried out by the dealers.  Costing depreciation of assets and costs associated 
with risks are also problematic.  However, it is possible to examine price differences (i.e., 
marketing margins) at succeeding levels in the chain, which are observed differences in the 
price of a commodity at different points in the supply chain.  The Ministry of Agriculture 
collects annual information on the wholesale price of DAP fertilizer at Nakuru, a relatively 
accessible area west of Nairobi along the major Trans-Africa Highway.  However, we 
obtained two MoA Nakuru price series that have some moderate differences.  In Figures 5 
and 6, we report fertilizer marketing margins for DAP between the port of Mombasa and 
Nakuru, based on both official MoA fertilizer price series.   Figure 5 shows the marketing 
margins in US$ per ton terms, while Figure 6 show margins denominated in 2005 real Kshs 
per 50kgs.  
 
Since the introduction of fertilizer market reform in the early 1990s, the price differences 
between Mombasa and Nakuru have declined substantially.  During the 1990–1995 periods, 
mean domestic costs were $262 per ton, in contrast to $206 per ton between 1996 and 2000, 
and $137 per ton between 2003 and 2005.  Mean marketing margins have therefore declined 
by 206-137=$69 per ton between the early 1990s and the early 2000s – a 40% reduction.    
 
However, because of increased international fertilizer prices in recent years, this period has 
seen relatively higher nominal US dollar prices CIF Mombasa than any period since 
liberalization (Figure 5).This means that there has been upward pressure on domestic 
fertilizer prices stemming from increased international prices.  However, the reduction in 
domestic fertilizer marketing margins over the same period has largely nullified the impact of 
higher international prices on Kenyan farmers.  Nominal fertilizer prices in Kenyan shillings 
have remained between a narrow band (generally between Kshs 1200 and Kshs 1500) for 
DAP over the entire period 1995 to 2004, despite the consumer price index having risen by 
74 percent over the same period.   From this, one can conclude that the reduction in domestic 
market costs over the past decade in Kenya has been an important contributory factor for 
maintaining the profitability of its use.  These cost reductions have most likely contributed 
greatly to the growth in smallholder fertilizer use.  
 
The raw data used to prepare Figures 6 and 7 below are contained in Appendices 6 and 7.  
 
Ironically, the decline in fertilizer marketing margins has occurred within the context of a 
deteriorating railway system in Kenya, and most of the fertilizer transported up-country over 
the past 15 years has shifted from rail to road transportation.  Greater public investment 
devoted to physical infrastructure, not only the road and rail system but also at the Port of 
Mombasa, could further promote the uptake of fertilizer by small farmers in the years ahead.   
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FIGURE 4. NAKURU - MOMBASA COST DIFFERENCES (DI-AMMONIUN 
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FIGURE 5. NAKURU - MOMBASA COST DIFFERENCES, DI-AMMONIUN 
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6.3 Trends in Maize-Fertilizer Price Ratios 
 
Since the reform of maize markets in the early 1990s, most small farmers in Kenya sell to 
private traders.  The Tegemeo/Egerton/MSU household survey has tracked the maize selling 
and buying behavior of 1,364 small farm households over time, from 1996/97 to 2003/04.  
About 32% of these households are located in the prime maize-surplus districts of Trans 
Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, upper Kakamega, Nakuru, upper Narok, and Bomet.  In this High-
Potential Maize Zone, we find that 9% of those households sold to NCPB, while 91% sold to 
private buyers.  Over the entire nationwide sample, only 3% of the households sold to the 
NCPB, while 34% sold to private buyers.  The remainder of the sample did not sell maize.   
 
These results indicate that the relevant maize prices for tracking maize/fertilizer price ratios is 
the local wholesale market price in the surplus producing zones.  The Ministry of Agriculture 
tracks monthly wholesale maize prices in Eldoret (Uasin Gishu), Kitale (Trans Nzoia) and 
Nakuru.  Maize-DAP fertilizer (CIF Mombasa) price ratios from 1990 to 2004 are presented 
in Figure 7.  This price ratio provides a picture of trends in price incentives to use basal 
fertilizer on maize given the movements in international fertilizer prices.  As can be seen 
from Figure 5, there is a general downward trend in this price ratio, which would indicate that 
farmers might have had less incentive to use DAP on maize, other factors constant. 
 
Fortunately, other factors helped to offset this discouraging trend.  In particular, it has been 
shown in the previous section that domestic fertilizer marketing costs have declined 
tremendously between 1990 and the early 2000s.  For this reason, the rise in international 
fertilizer prices has not been fully passed on to Kenyan farmers.  Figure 8 presents the maize-
fertilizer price ratio for DAP at Nakuru.  The price ratio is highly variable across the period, 
but it does not exhibit the downward trend that is evident in Figure 7.   It can be concluded 
that the reduction in domestic fertilizer marketing costs which occurred during the period of 
fertilizer market liberalization has maintained price incentives for Kenyan farmers despite a 
rise in international fertilizer prices and a secular decline in wholesale maize prices during the 
1990-2004 period. 
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FIGURE 6.  PRICE RATIOS, WHOLESALE MAIZE / DAP FERTILIZER AT 
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Source:  Ministry of Agriculture data files 
 
FIGURE 7. PRICE RATIOS, WHOLESALE MAIZE / DAP FERTILIZER AT 
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6.4 Opportunities to Further Reduce Marketing Margins in Kenya 
 
Despite the substantial reduction in domestic marketing margins, there is still significant 
opportunity for further cost reduction in the fertilizer supply chain.  
 
Exchange rate fluctuations can create risks particularly for deferred Letters of Credit (LC) 
where the importers agree to pay after some months (60 days or 120 days).  In the intervening 
period exchange rates might shift unfavorably against the importer.  The use of exchange rate 
hedging may reduce some part of this risk. 
 
Another impediment is the slow refund of value added tax (VAT).  Fertilizer imports are 
VAT exempt meaning that it is refundable but only after payment to the government.   
Another problem is the slow clearing process and other inefficiencies at the port of Mombasa. 
In addition to these sources of cost reduction, we highlight three main sources of potential 
reductions in fertilizer marketing costs.  
 
Policies to coordinate port clearing with inland transport. Problems in coordinating the 
clearing of fertilizer from the port with the availability of domestic inland transportation 
introduced extra marketing costs in Kenya (and other African countries).  It might take 5-10 
days to clear a consignment of 20,000 tons, and this could trigger demurrage charges.   
Moreover, traders surveyed by Wanzala et al (2002) in Kenya indicated that they could not 
transport their fertilizer directly up-country from the port of Mombasa because of problems in 
securing transport to coincide with the uncertain timing of when the fertilizer to be cleared 
from the port.  Rules prohibit all but two transport companies from operating at the port, 
thereby forcing most traders to store their fertilizer in local warehouses near the port before 
arranging for road transport for subsequent movement up-country. This extra stage involved 
an additional $8 to $15 per ton in transport and handling costs. The Kenya Port Authority 
(KPA) also stipulates that stevedoring and loading onto vehicles at the port can only be 
carried out by KPA employees at KPA rates.  By imposing extra storage, handling, and 
transport costs on traders, these regulations inflate marketing costs that are ultimately passed 
on to farmers (Jayne et al., 2003).  
 
Reassess levies on fertilizer and transportation.  Levies incurred at the port of Mombasa 
accounted for 2% to 3% of the farm-gate price (see Appendices 4 and 5). While levies are 
important for financing the cost of public services such as inspection, levies on fertilizer 
appear to be excessive in relation to the normal expected costs of carrying out inspection 
functions.  
 
Investments in transportation infrastructure.  Domestic transport costs per kilometer increase 
greatly toward the end of the supply chain as fertilizer is transported in smaller units along 
generally poorer-quality roads. Wanzala et al (2002) found that fertilizer was often 
transported by retail bicycle transporters 15 kilometers from retail shops to villages, and these 
costs typically accounted for $20 or more per ton, about the same as the international 
shipping costs from international suppliers to the ports. Efforts to improve rural road 
infrastructure and transport systems could have high payoffs not only for the economics of 
fertilizer use, but for economic activity in general. 
 
Potential effects of banking and foreign exchange system performance on fertilizer prices.  
Wanzala et al (2002) provide an interesting example of how unforeseen risks may affect the 
profits of fertilizer traders and prices borne by farmers.  In the area and time during which the   33
data for this scenario was computed, two major importers were unable to import fertilizer 
because their local bank had a temporary liquidity problem, and as a result the international 
bank refused to guarantee their letters of credit. Wholesalers that had arranged to be supplied 
by these importers were therefore temporarily unable to secure fertilizer to distribution in 
their areas. This created a localized shortage of fertilizer in their distribution areas which 
another major importer attempted to fill by ordering another consignment which began to 
arrive and be distributed in March/April.  However, in the interim, local supplies were 
constrained and prices reached unprecedented levels of up to US$570 per ton in March 1999. 
 
To conclude, there appears to be considerable scope to reduce fertilizer marketing costs in 
Kenya, despite much progress having already been made in this regard.  Much of this 
potential is in the area of transportation and handling costs, although the catalysts for 
reducing these costs are varied and include changes in regulations that inhibit better 
coordination between stages in the marketing system, the design of government programs, 
and investing in public goods. 
 
7.  Analysis of Alternative Fertilizer Delivery Systems in Kenya  
 
7.1  Sugarcane - Mumias 
 
The Mumias sugar and outgrower company serving smallholders in Kakamega and Bungoma 
have been the most successful sugar operations in Kenya during the past decade (Argwings-
Kodhek, 1995; Sugar Task Force, 2003).  The other main sugarcane producing areas in 
Kenya are located primarily in Nyanza Province and are mainly state corporations. These 
include Mumias, Nzoia, South Nyanza, Chemilil and Muhoroni sugar Company.   
 
In all of the sugarcane areas in Kenya, the sugar processing companies liaise with producer-
based outgrower companies comprised of small farmers.  The companies’ main interest is to 
ensure quality cane in adequate volumes to achieve throughput requirements.  There are 
significant scale economies in sugar processing, such that increased volumes received from 
farmers can generate lower unit processing costs.  Argwings-Kodhek (1995) found that 
Mumias achieved lower unit processing costs than several other state-managed sugar 
companies and passed some of these lower costs back to producers in the form of higher 
producer prices.  The recent Sugar Task Force concluded that Mumias offered higher prices 
to its farmers than all other sugar firms.  Most of the sugarcane outgrower companies procure 
fertilizer from local importers/wholesalers for their nucleus farms and cane farmers.  It is 
only Mumias Sugar Company that has occasionally been importing directly itself without 
recourse to others.  However, due to lack of economies of scale (Mumias uses a tiny fraction 
of the total fertilizer and far less than the 25,000 ton import figure required to achieve scale 
economies in freight and other charges) and financial constraints, Mumias has mainly 
resorted to sourcing from private importers.  Up until recently Mumias has been importing its 
own fertilizers but financial considerations have induced them to contract private importers.  
Its demand for fertilizer is below 6,000 tons which implies high freight and other costs if the 
company imports independently.  
 
Sugar production in Kenya is organized around sugar companies that have a nucleus estate 
and smallholder outgrower farmers. These factories are partly owned by government and 
subject to government appointees to the board of management. Some directors are elected by   34
members who include sugar farmers.  Most of the outgrowers belong to a cooperative that 
provide inputs and other services on credit. These basically involve inputs such as fertilizers 
and land preparation service provided by the sugar companies that are also responsible for 
harvesting the crop and transporting it to factories for milling.  The cost of inputs and land 
preparation costs are later deducted from the farmers’ payment after harvest.  
 
This setup has been working satisfactorily but has increasingly become subject to 
management, financial problems, and farmer under-representation in decision making that 
reduce incentives for farmers to support the outgrower programmes.  
 
 
TABLE 16.  INCOMES, ASSETS, AND APPLICATION RATES FOR WESTERN 
TRANSITIONAL ZONE (BUNGOMA AND KAKAMEGA) –MUMIAS 
  1996 1997 2000 2004
Number of Households Interviewed  133 133 133 133
% Households Using Fertilizer  38% 35% 61% 58%
% Crop Area Fertilized  38% 37% 63% 62%
Fertilizer Rate/ acre  51 42 123 83
Source: Tegemeo/Egerton/MSU Rural Household Surveys 
 
 
Industry data indicate that fertilizer use has increased in the sugar belt after liberalization.  
This is corroborated by the Tegemeo rural survey shown in Table 16.  More households 
growing sugarcane in the Mumias areas are using fertilizer in 2003/04 compared to 1996/97 
and also the area under sugarcane that is fertilized has increased from 37% to 62%.   
However, this has not apparently translated into better living standards.  The median value of 
agricultural assets for households in this belt is lower than their 1997 levels.
12  Median 
household incomes show great variability, and were probably adversely affected in 2003/04 
by poor weather conditions.  However, frequent managerial issues and alleged political 
interference has impacted negatively in all the sugar factories.  There is also very low 
technology adoption of new varieties of cane and research/farmer linkages are weak.  Failure 
of the industry to induce the use of improved cane over the past several decades has reduced 
the contribution of fertilizer to sugar productivity growth, and has clearly been a constraint on 
effective demand for fertilizer in the sugar belt areas. 
 
 
7.2 Sugarcane – Nyanza outgrower programs 
 
These programs cover the Kisumu and Siaya areas of Nyanza province.  Outgrower company 
performance is poor compared to Mumias.  These areas cover some of the poorest zones in 
the whole country (Gamba and Mghenyi, 2003).  Table 17 shows lower indicators compared 
to Table 16 for Mumias. The number of households using fertilizer is much lower and so are 
the application rates per acre compared to the Mumias farmers as presented in Table 16 
above. 
 
                                                 
12 The consistent set of assets covered across each survey included animals, ploughs, 
harrows, ox-carts, irrigation equipment, farm implements, bicycles, and vehicles.     35
TABLE 17.  INCOMES, LAND, ASSETS, AND FERTILIZER APPLICATION 
RATES FOR WESTERN LOWLANDS ZONE (KISUMU AND SIAYA) 
  1996 1997 2000 2004
Number of Households  32 32 32  32
% Households Using Fertilizer  8% 9% 7%  6%
Acres Planted (whole Sample)  34.00 61.25 2.25  74.25
% acres Fertilized  3% 11% 4%  9%
Fertilizer rate /acre  4.02 6.24 3.60  5.73
Source: Tegemeo/MSU Rural Survey Data  
 
 
However, overall use of fertilizer for the entire zone rose from 382 in 1997 to 450 kilograms 
in 2004. Yet only 9 percent of the sugarcane area in these zones is fertilized, and only 6 
percent of households use fertilizer on sugarcane.  One of the constraints affecting the 
performance on these factories is the use of poor planting material (higher productivity 
materials available at KARI have not been adopted).  Also, there are widespread allegations 
of mismanagement of factory and society affairs and associated financial problems that 
ultimately discourage farmers’ support for continued participation.  Improved efficiency of 
the interlinked input-credit-output marketing programs for small sugar farmers may 
appreciably improve the incentives for expanded fertilizer use in these sugar-growing areas.  
 
 
7.3 Tea – KTDA interlinked system 
 
Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) was established in 1964 as a parastatal that 
provides integrated services to smallholders to help them grow tea by providing marketing 
and financial services.  All growers’ tea factories have shares in KTDA, which levies a fee 
per kilo of leaf for its services. As a virtual monopoly, KTDA is in charge of all aspects of tea 
growing and marketing, including plant research and development, distribution of fertilizers, 
financing, and providing extension services.  KTDA supplies fertilizer on credit to 
smallholders and then deducts the cost plus interest from their deliveries of tea which is sold 
by KTDA on behalf of farmers.  KTDA provides credit to farmers served by 44 factories 
under its jurisdiction. 
 
The process of acquiring fertilizer for tea development starts from estimates made by field 
extension agents on amounts of tea requirements by each farmer at the factory level. 
Following this a national estimate of fertilizer requirement is made and KTDA invites tenders 
from international and local suppliers of fertilizer.  Once tenders have been awarded to the 
importing firm, arrangements are made to store the fertilizer at a KTDA-owned warehouse in 
Mombasa as soon as the fertilizer arrives.  Due to its large annual fertilizer purchases, the 
KTDA can potentially attract lower freight charges and possibilities of negotiating prices.  
However, whether this happens or not is not clear from discussions with key officials at 
KTDA.  Once the fertilizer arrives at the warehouse in Mombasa, KTDA again invites 
tenders for transport to inland delivery points.  Farmers receive their allocations as they 
deliver tea leaves at collection centers countrywide.  The largest growth in fertilizer usage has 
occurred in the Western Highlands zones (e.g., Vihiga and Kisii districts). 
 
KTDA has continued to distribute its fertilizers through the Tea factories which have acted as 
their distribution outlets to the farmer members. The mode of procurement is by an organized 
order arrangement for farmers through their respective Tea factories. The number of factories   36
handled by this organization is 44 distributed in major tea growing.  The level of inputs 
handled by this channel has been growing over the years (Figure 10). One advantage with 
KTDA is that it can reduce freight charges by importing consignments in shiploads of more 
than 20,000 tons which reduces charges. In addition there are fewer middlemen or sub-agents 
in the chain and this helps reduce costs along the chain.  
 
Since KTDA is a parastatal, the process of fertilizer acquisition is subject to a tendering 
process.  Interviews with several industry respondents indicated a belief that the KTDA’s 
tendering process is vulnerable to rent-seeking as powerful individuals with political clout 
can possibly steer tenders to parties related to them and therefore skew prices against the 
smallholders. This possible situation may be exacerbated by the government’s refusal to 
allow private competitors to supply fertilizer to smallholder tea growers.  Hence, despite the 
relative success of tea as a crop and its influence on fertilizer use, the prices paid by farmers 
for fertilizer may be different than what they could be under the counterfactual, and further 
analysis would be warranted to determine whether a more transparent and competitive 
tendering process could result in reducing fertilizer prices for tea farmers. 
 
One interesting area for further study is to find out why large private tea estates use private 
importers rather than KTDA for procuring fertilizers.  Estate producers such as Brooke Bond 
and African Highlands use Supplies and Services Ltd to procure their fertilizer.  It would be 
interesting to compare the costs of fertilizer or margins through Supplies and Services Ltd 
and KTDA to similar destinations.  Recently, the KTDA has changed to a different fertilizer 
from the one it had been supplying for many years. The shift from NPK 25:5:5s (which 
includes sulfur) to NPK 25:5:5 was necessitated by complaints that soils were being affected 
adversely by using this type repeatedly.  
 
Despite these problems, the KTDA system has over the past 40 years facilitated tremendous 
growth in fertilizer use on tea by smallholder farmers.  This can be attributed to area 
expansion and also increased application rates by smallholders.  Figure 9 below shows trend 
of imports in the last 15 years.  Since 1990, KTDA imports have risen from 50,000 tons 
annually to more than 70,000 tons. 
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FIGURE 8. IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION TRENDS FOR TEA FERTILIZERS  
 
 Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Authors’ Computations 
 
 
The Tegemeo panel data provide some explanations for this increase demand for fertilizer.  
Table 18 presents information on the number of households growing tea in 1996/97, 1999/00, 
and 2003/04 (out of the total Tegemeo sample size of 1320 households), as well as their 
fertilizer application rates on tea, by zone. 
 
The percentage of cropped area fertilized has risen since 1997 from 88% to 93%. In addition 
the doses or application rates per acre have also risen from 326 kgs to 387 kgs and the 
number of households using fertilizer has grown in the same period.  Most of the increase in 
number of households growing tea has occurred in the Western Highlands Zone (Kisii and 
Vihiga districts). The Vihiga district had the highest area increases due to increased area and 
new farmers starting tea growing with an expansion of KTDA services in these areas.   
Another factor driving overall growth in Kenya’s tea industry has been buoyant international 























TABLE 18. TEGEMEO PANEL DATA STATISTICS ON PERCENT OF TEA AREA 
FERTILIZED, APPLICATION RATES, AND NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS USING 
FERTILIZER IN TEA 
Agro-Ecological Zones  Year  Number of 
Households
Fertilizer 
Application  / Acre 
% Cropped Area 
Fertilized
High Potential Maize Zone  1996  33 291  83%
 1997  33 283  95%
 2000  34 264  96%
 2004  35 298  91%
    
Western Highlands  1996  31 164  89%
 1997  41 130  76%
 2000  45 314  98%
 2004  58 283  90%
    
Central Highlands  1996  99 389  85%
 1997  100 420  88%
 2000  102 383  97%
 2004  109 471  95%
    
Whole Sample  1996  163 326  85%
 1997  174 326  88%
 2000  181 344  98%
 2004  202 387  93%
Source: Tegemeo/MSU Rural Survey Panel Data 
   
 
7.4 Open Market Commercial system (maize, wheat, and horticulture)  
 
During the period of state control over agricultural marketing before 1990, the cereal sector 
depended on the Agricultural Finance Corporation’s (AFC) seasonal loans scheme to finance 
its activities. However, even after market decontrol, the AFC extended loans to maize and 
wheat producers, with the bulk of the value of loans disbursed to large farmers.  Because of 
chronic loan default problems, the AFC’s financial base cannot offer adequate credit to the 
farming community.  Since the early 1990s, almost all of the fertilizer used by small farmers 
on maize and horticultural crops is purchased on cash terms through independent wholesaler 
and retailer supply channels.  While some fertilizer dealers provide fertilizer on credit, the 
Tegemeo data indicate that the vast majority of smallholder farmers pay cash for fertilizer 
applied on maize and horticultural crops.   
 
To some extent, smallholder maize and horticulture producers have enjoyed spillover benefits 
from participation in sugarcane outgrower schemes and coffee cooperatives.  In many cases, 
these cash cropping firms have allowed farmers to also acquire additional fertilizer on credit 
for use on food crops.  The firms’ ability to do this is tied to being able to recoup the loan 
when the household sells its cash crop (e.g., coffee or sugarcane) to the firm.  Thus, there is 
evidence that these interlinked cash crop programs have promoted input intensification not 
only on the particular crop but on a range of other crops as well (Jayne, Yamano, and Nyoro, 
2004).   As long as these interlinked credit-input-marketing arrangements (e.g., coffee, tea, 
sugar) can be kept relatively efficient and attractive for farmers, they can serve as an   39
important engine of productivity growth by further stimulating fertilizer use both on cash 
crops, and on food crops for which credit access is otherwise difficult to obtain.  
 
In addition to potential synergies between participation in cash crop outgrower arrangements 
and food crop intensification, there are some trade-offs as well.  Some of the fertilizer 
acquired for intended use on the cash crop under these schemes is appropriate for use on 
maize and most horticultural crops as well, and there is likely to have been some diversion of 
fertilizer targeted for use in coffee, tea and sugarcane to food crops to the disadvantage of the 
respective sub-sectors.
13   
 
 
7.5   Coffee Cooperatives (Murang’a, Meru, Nyeri) 
 
Traditionally, cooperatives have played a key role in rural development providing vehicles 
through which government and donors have channeled funds/aid to smallholders in form of 
credit or inputs. A few decades ago the coffee cooperative system was a mammoth operation 
that was able to import and deliver fertilizer and other inputs on credit to its members all over 
the country.  Coffee and tea, which used about 40% of the fertilizers, had an elaborate credit 
system accorded to the respective farmers through a number of programs like the Second 
Coffee Improvement Program (SCIP) for coffee (see below) and KTDA for tea.  The 
respective financiers are able to recover the loans upon delivery of the produce to factories or 
collection centers.  SCIP, a donor funded program, provided credit to coffee societies which 
were used to procure fertilizers and also improve the general conditions of factories.  
 
SCIP used to accord loans to societies for coffee improvement, at an interest rate of 15% 
slightly less than the prevailing market rate then.  To improve recovery SCIP dealt with 
societies, which then channeled their payments through the Co-operative Bank.  However, 
SCIP is no longer active and farmers owe billions of unpaid debts. The government has 
indicated that it might write-off these bad debts owed by farmers. 
 
Cooperatives and their unions provided the government and donors with the avenues for 
reaching smallholder farmers through credit and input provision, processing and marketing of 
farm produce. The Ministry of Cooperatives Development has as supervisory role over 
cooperatives with the minister having strong influence in decisions at the cooperative level. 
This arrangement has often meant that cooperative undergo lots of bureaucratic hurdles in 
carrying out day to day activities.  
 
However, cooperatives are not doing very well today and finding a successful cooperative is 
a difficult task.  Coffee cooperatives are the main channels through which members receive 
their fertilizer.  Farmers deliver their coffee to the nearest factory which is a member of a 
cooperative which used to be a member of a union of cooperatives. Most of the unions are 
non-existent today as individual cooperative societies broke off and now run their business 
individually.  Large cooperative unions like Muran’ga Union used to import fertilizers 
directly on behalf of their members (cooperative societies, factories, smallholders) but are no 
longer able to do this. Currently individual cooperatives are either purchasing from private 
importers for their members or tendering in the private sector for supply of fertilizers. In their 
                                                 
13 This is less likely with tea because the NPK tea fertilizers are not very appropriate for use on 
maize.   40
heydays cooperative unions could get financing arrangements from the Cooperative Bank of 
Kenya for import activities.  
 
Cooperatives, when run efficiently have the potential of providing farmers with low cost 
fertilizers (economies), credit provision in interlocked input-output markets like coffee. 
However, as explained earlier, bureaucracy, management problems linked to political 
interference and an unclear government policy have combined to make the cooperative 
movement collapse.  Currently fertilizer inputs are being accessed directly from private 
traders by individual farmers, though some functioning cooperatives tender through the 
private sector.  Donors like DANIDA at one time used to provide credit o smallholder 
through cooperatives:  Farm Input Supply Scheme (FISS) is one such case in 1976-1984 
which injected some 40 million shillings into the cooperatives movement. Other donor 
schemes include the Integrated Agricultural Development Project (IADP) of the World Bank 
and Second Coffee Improvement Project (SCIP) which was intended to improve the factories 
and provide inputs for rural development.  None of these programs have been considered 
successful and currently farmers owe millions of debts for these projects.  
 
Due to alleged mismanagement and poor international prices coupled with unclear market 
liberalization policies, smallholders have reduced their fertilizer application on coffee.  This 
has been more pronounced in the Western belt where dismal results have been seen (Figure 
10). 
 
FIGURE 9. COFFEE FERTILIZER IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION, KENYA  
 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture Data Files 
 
The analysis of the Tegemeo panel data agrees with the above national pictures as shown in 
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to 2003/04 period.  The percent area under fertilizer has continued to decline in this period 
and so is the number of households applying fertilizer. 
 
A comparison of the more efficient coffee systems of Central Highlands and the less efficient 
of Western and Eastern Lowlands provides interesting contrasts. The more efficient 
smallholder systems in Central Highlands (Nyeri, Murang’a and Meru) have higher 
household asset values, acreages under coffee and higher application rates per acre.  In 
addition, the decline in percentage acreage under fertilizer is highest in the west; there was a 
general decline from 74% to 65% in central highlands compared to a drop from 28% to 17% 
in the West and East in area under fertilizer. 
 
TABLE 19. MEAN STATISTICS FOR SMALL FARM COFFEE GROWING 
HOUSEHOLDS, COMPARING THE RELATIVELY EFFICIENT CENTRAL 
HIGHLANDS TO THE WESTERN AND EASTERN COFFEE GROWING AREAS 



































 1997  42,273  126,400  0.46 0.62  74% 139  67%  122 
 2000  27,633  164,370  0.78 0.87  90% 163  75%  165 
 2004  21,608  108,531  0.33 0.51  65% 151  70%  135 
                




















 1997  36,300  86,899  0.17 0.61  28% 120  21%  26 
 2000  27,972  115,430  0.33 0.47  70% 148  34%  43 
 2004  15,750  76,645  0.05 0.29  17% 134  27%  24 
          Note: (* Nyeri, Murang’a, and Meru relatively efficient; **mainly Vihiga, Kisii, and Kakamega ). 
         Source: Tegemeo/Egerton/MSU Rural Household Surveys  
 
 
The Central Highland coffee growers have generally higher incomes and agricultural assets 
values than their counterparts. The income and asset value decline between 1997 and 2004 is 
more in the Western parts than Central Zone.   The percentage of households using fertilizer 
declined for both regions but more so for the West, which had 27% of households growing 
coffee using fertilizer. Fertilizer application rates per acre in the West are a small fraction of 
those in the Central region. 
 
 
7.6 Donor-Supported Initiatives to Raise Fertilizer Use 
 
A number of organizations and donor-funded projects have attempted to create demand for 
fertilizer using diverse approaches.  The Sustainable Community-Oriented Development 
Program (SCODP) is a one such project operating with donor support in the relatively semi-
arid areas of western Kenya where fertilizer use has been very low but where some potential 
for increased use has been identified. An initial survey by SCODP, a local NGO, noted that 
rural western Kenya (Ugunja, Bumala region) is deficient in phosphorous (P) resulting in 
crop yields and inadequate food production.  The NGO developed an integrated approach to 
stimulate farmers to start using fertilizer.  First it was recognized that the problem was lack of   42
awareness, lack of access to appropriate fertilizer, and poor advice for use of fertilizer by 
farmers. A survey was carried out to determine the need and requirements by consumers. It 
became apparent that the issue was the size of fertilizer packages. An input delivery system 
was put in place where small packets of fertilizer (from 100gms) were conveniently placed 
outside shops and in market places. Large packages (50kgs) were beyond farmers cash limits. 
Demand was simulated by: 
 
•  Farm input supply where local shops are networked to supply fertilizer 
•  Farmer-participatory research; farmers determine appropriate fertilizers and feed 
information to shop owners 
•  Fertilizer “mini-packs”; eventually those who bought these could sometimes come for 
even bigger packets. 
 
The impacts were measured and indicated improved shop profits, increase shop customer 
numbers, and increased food production. This project is estimated to have taken 
approximately $350,000 over 4-5 years to serve a population of 1 million people.  
 
More recent developments include "commercialization" training of many rural retail 
shopkeepers trained through the Rockefeller-funded CNFA program so they can better 
manage the shops.  Results have been mixed with the privatization; in general, business and 
financial management seems to be a problem for SCODP. 
  
Another on-going programme is the Farm Input Promotions (FIPS) Program, a private NGO.  
FIPS has hired its own extension agents, who work with the Ministry of Agriculture in some 
circumstances, but are really quite independent.   They  have  been funded by USAID, 
Rockefeller, and others.  They work closely with input suppliers and have helped Athi River 
Mining develop and distribute a new fertilizer that contains potassium and important 
micronutrients; it is marketed in 1 kg bags as well as larger sizes.  Over the past several years, 
fertilizer sales have increased rapidly and FIPS is becoming a major player in the distribution 
of small packs to farmers.  FIPS also provides information to farmers on soil testing, seed 
varieties, appropriate use of fertilizer, and other kinds of extension advice.  Many farmers 
interviewed by the authors in Western Kenya in May 2006 had already had interactions with 
FIPS and felt that the extension messages helped them to use fertilizer more profitably.  This 
highlights the importance of knowledge in raising the effective demand for fertilizer.   
 
Fertilizer policy in Kenya has recently received international attention with the high profile 
entrance of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, one of which is the increased use of 
fertilizer and other inputs to reduce poverty in developing countries. There are concerted 
discussions between the government, donors, and NGOs on what is the best way to raise 
application rates in Kenya and also introduce fertilizer to new areas. The Ministry of 
Agriculture is currently considering a program to distribute free or subsidized fertilizer to 2.5 
million small farms for use on ½ hectare plots as a means to alleviate rural poverty and 
promote food security, following models previously tried in Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia and elsewhere under the SG-2000 program (although the SG-2000 programs 
featured limited subsidies and relied more on credit, while the proposed MOA plan is to 
provide free fertilizer).  The sustainability of such programmes, and their ability to deal with 
downstream issues of crop marketing, specifically how the marketing system can deal with 
slumping maize prices brought on by a large maize production response, has repeatedly been 
brought to question.  
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8.  Reasons for Small Farmers’ Increased Use of Fertilizer 
in Kenya (1996-2004). 
 
This study identifies three main factors driving the growth in fertilizer use in Kenya.   
 
1.  The Government of Kenya has provided a stable fertilizer policy environment since the 
early 1990s, which has encouraged a major investment response by private importers, 
wholesalers, and retailers.  Because of the increasing geographic density of rural retailers 
operating in the rural areas, small-scale farm households’ distance to the nearest fertilizer 
retailer has declined substantially over the 1996-2004 period.  This has reduced the 
transaction costs borne by farmers in acquiring fertilizer, and therefore continuously raised 
the effective demand for fertilizer.  
 
2.  A steady reduction in domestic fertilizer marketing margins since liberalization in 1993, 
which has offset rising world fertilizer costs and declining maize prices, and thus maintained 
price incentives to use fertilizer on maize.  
 
3.  Shifts in maize cultivation from mono-crop to intercrop in some areas, which has allowed 
maize to ‘piggyback’ on the profitability of other high-valued crops, such as fresh fruits and 
vegetables. 
 
These factors are now discussed in turn.  
 
 
8.1   Small-farmers’ improved proximity to fertilizer retailers 
 
Table 17 shows the household characteristics of four sets of farmer groups surveyed in the 
Tegemeo Rural Household surveys:  (1) those not using fertilizer on maize in any of the 3 
years (1996/97, 1999/00 and 2003/04) (370 households);  (2) those applying more than 50kgs 
per acre of maize in all 3 years (123 households); (3) those whose fertilizer use on maize 
steadily increased over the 3 years (316 households); and (4) those whose fertilizer use on 
maize steadily declined over the 3 years.
14   Looking at the second row of Table 17, the 
importance of physical proximity to fertilizer stands out clearly.  In each survey, households 
were asked the distance to the nearest fertilizer retailer in their area.  Across the entire sample 
of small-scale households, the distance to the nearest fertilizer retailer declined dramatically 
between 1997 and 2004, from 8.39kms to 4.14kms.  This is consistent with the IFDC’s 
(2001) finding that the number of fertilizer retailers in Kenya has expanded tremendously in 
the past decade after the fertilizer market was deregulated and donated/government 
operations were curtailed.   
 
                                                 
14 Households decreasing in fertilizer use satisfied this condition:  (q97+q00)/2 > 1.25*(q00+q04)/2, where q is 
kgs fertilizer applied per acre of maize (mono + intercrop).  Households increasing in fertilizer use satisfied this 
condition:  1.25 * (q97+q00)/2 < (q00+q04)/2.   There were 339 households showing neither a clear increase or 
decrease in fertilizer use over the 3 years, but these households are included in the last column (entire sample) of 
Table 12.  
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The importance of physical proximity is also important in distinguishing between households 
using and not using fertilizer.  Among households not using fertilizer on maize in any of the 3 
years, note that their distance from the nearest retailer was as high as 18.65 kilometers in 
1997, declining to 8.23 kilometers in 2004.  This contrasts with households increasing in 
fertilizer use, who were 4.3 kms away from the nearest retailer in 1997, declining to 2.3kms 
in 2004.  And among those households consistently using high amounts of fertilizer on maize, 
the distance to the nearest retailer declined from 4.4 to 2.5kms.  Overall, there has been a 
striking improvement in small farmers’ proximity to fertilizer sellers in Kenya over the past 
decade.  The denser network of rural fertilizer retailers has most likely played a major role in 
expanding fertilizer use by small farmers.  
 
However, improved physical proximity cannot necessarily overcome other major barriers to 
fertilizer use, such as affordability.  The data in Table 19 also indicate that household 
fertilizer use on maize is associated with relatively large farms and income.  This indicates 
that relatively poor households’ access to fertilizer may be limited by financial constraints.  
Despite the growth in overall fertilizer consumption, there is a need to overcome credit 
problems for farmers with relatively low incomes who are not able to participate in the 
interlinked credit-input-crop marketing programs.  But providing credit for poor farmers will 
not do much good unless there is a crop on which it is profitable to apply fertilizer.  This is 
more likely to be the case in medium- to high-potential areas.  In low-potential, semi-arid 
areas, fertilizer promotion may simply not be a sustainable means to promote household 
welfare.  Greater payoffs may be obtained by investing in livestock and off-farm sectors, or 
in crops that don’t require fertilization for profitability (e.g., certain tree crops).  
 
TABLE 20. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FARM HOUSEHOLDS, GROUPED 
WITH RESPECT TO THEIR FERTILIZER USE BEHAVIOR ON MAIZE 
 Households 
not using 




















acre maize  


















Distance to nearest 
tarmac road:   
(kms) 
2004 10.58  6.87  6.45  5.26  7.69 
1997 18.65  4.36  4.02  4.38  8.39  Distance to nearest 
fertilizer retailer 
(kms) 
2004 8.23  2.34  1.96  2.54  4.14 
1997 5.93  4.88  5.16  9.45  6.12  Total landholding 
size (acres)  2004 5.82  5.30  5.03  8.96  6.08 
1997 .00  27.29  86.34  110.67  60.81  Fertilizer on maize 
plots (kgs/acre)  2004 .00  85.56  25.02  124.81  64.12 
1997 27,731  33,159  48,944  48,640  35,600  Total household 




2004 27,268  38,664  47,709  51,559  40,466 
                                                 
15 26 hhs excluded which are also among those applying more than 50 kgs/acre in all 3 years 
16 18 hhs excluded which are also among those applying more than 50 kgs/acre in all 3 years 
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8.2 Lower Domestic Fertilizer Marketing Margins  
 
As shown in Section 6.2, domestic fertilizer marketing margins, the difference between CIF 
Mombasa prices and wholesale prices in Western Kenya, have declined by 40% over the past 
15 years since the fertilizer market was liberalized.  If inflation-adjusted marketing margins 
were held constant at their mean level between 1990-1995, fertilizer prices in the past several 
years would have been 55% higher than they were in actuality.  Thankfully for Kenyan 
farmers, the reduction in domestic fertilizer marketing costs which occurred during the period 
of fertilizer market liberalization has maintained price incentives for Kenyan farmers despite 
a rise in international fertilizer prices and a secular decline in wholesale maize prices during 
the 1990-2004 period. 
 
 
8.3   Shifts in maize cultivation from mono-crop to intercrop with high-valued 
horticulture crops. 
 
Part of the increase in small farmer fertilizer use on maize appears to be due to the rising 
importance of domestic horticulture in Kenya, and the apparent profitability of using fertilizer 
on horticultural crops (mainly fresh fruits and vegetables).   The amount of fertilizer being 
used on mono-crop maize appears to have stagnated since 1997.  But this has been offset by a 
rapid increase in fertilizer use on maize intercrop cultivation.  Upon further inspection, it is 
found that maize intercropped with horticultural crops are on the rise and are accounting for 
part of the increase in fertilizer use on intercropped maize fields.  Even in the High-Potential 
Maize Zones, where monocrop maize cultivation used to be the norm, there has been a shift 
from monocrop to intercrop, and increased use of fertilizer on maize intercropped fields.  
While further analysis is needed to fully disentangle the facts, initial evidence suggests that 
part of the explanation for the growth in fertilizer use intensity on maize is due to the rising 
cultivation of maize in combination with high-valued crops on which fertilizer appears to be 
especially profitable (refer back to Table 11 for preliminary evidence).  Promoting a 
marketing environment and infrastructure conducive to the development of horticultural crop 
supply chains, as Kenya has, may provide opportunities to stimulate fertilizer use on grain 
crops for small farmers in other countries as well.  
 
 
9.  Conclusions:  Implications for Policies and Programs 
 
Kenya is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa which has achieved 30% growth in fertilizer 
use per acre since the early 1990s starting from an initial base of at least 25 kgs per hectare.  
Given the many programs tried in Africa to kick-start fertilizer use, most of which have been 
unable to achieve the same growth as that in Kenya (e.g., SG-2000 programs in many 
countries, Malawi starter-packs, fertilizer subsidy programmes of various types), it may be 
instructive to examine closely the Kenyan experience, and to derive lessons for potential 
replication elsewhere.   
 
According to the Tegemeo/Egerton/MSU longitudinal household survey data, the proportion 
of small farm households using fertilizer has increased from 43% in 1995/96, to 51% in 
1996/97, to 65% in 1999/00 to 69% in 2003/04.  These rates vary considerably throughout   46
the country, ranging from less than 10% of households surveyed in the drier lowland areas to 
over 85% of small farmers in Central Province and the High-Potential Maize Zones of the 
North Rift.   
 
The largest increases in the proportion of households using fertilizer occurred in areas of 
moderate to high agro-ecological potential.  Between the 1996/97 and 2003/04 seasons, the 
proportion of households using fertilizer rose from 57% to 74% in the Western Highlands 
(Vihiga and Kisii districts), from 69% to 90% in the High-Potential Maize Zone (Trans 
Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, and Lugari districts), and from 32% to 61% in the Western Transitional 
Zone (Kakamega and Bungoma districts).  By contrast, the proportion of households using 
fertilizer in the Coastal Lowlands and Western Lowlands/Nyanza areas has stagnated at 6% 
percent and 8%, respectively.  
 
When considering the proportion of small-scale households using fertilizer today compared 
to potential use, it is important to take account of the number of households that cannot at 
present time use fertilizer profitably.  Since fertilizer use has limited potential in the coastal 
and western lowlands without irrigation potential, it is likely that the potential for profitable 
use of fertilizer nationwide would not exceed 75 to 85 percent of small-scale households at 
most.  If these estimates are roughly accurate, then according to the Tegemeo surveys, about 
81 to 92 percent of the small-scale farmers nationwide who could be profitably using 
fertilizer were in fact using fertilizer in 2003/04. 
 
Levels of fertilizer use per hectare have increased over the 1996/97 to 2003/04 seasons by 
roughly 10%.  Fertilizer use rates on maize in Western Kenya are comparable to, or exceed, 
fertilizer use rates in many parts of Asia and Latin America, where “green revolutions” have 
been widely cited to have occurred.  Households in the High Potential Maize Zone that 
applied fertilizer on monocropped maize averaged 232 kgs per hectare in 2003/04.  Fertilized 
intercropped maize fields in the High Potential Maize Zone received 189 kgs per hectare.  In 
Kenya’s case, these fertilizer use rates on maize have been achieved largely under dry land 
conditions (in contrast to much of Asia’s irrigated land advantage), and where maize 
marketing conditions have been problematic and subject to considerable policy uncertainty.   
 
Fertilizer dose rates on tea have declined a bit over the past 4-5 years, although the 
percentage of farmers using fertilizer on tea and the area devoted to tea have both risen.  
Fertilizer dose rates on sugarcane have risen in the Western Transitional Zone, but remain 
stagnant in the Western Lowlands.  Fertilizer dose rates on coffee have declined sharply in 
the Eastern Lowlands, declined moderately in the Central Highlands, but risen in the Western 
Highlands.  Lastly, the mean level of fertilizer use on horticultural crops has increased in the 
Western Transition and Western Highlands Zone as well as the Central Highlands.  
 
 
9.1 Factors Driving the Rise in Fertilizer Use in Kenya 
 
This study has identified four main reasons driving the growth in fertilizer use among small 
farmers in Kenya: 
 
First, the Government of Kenya has, since the early 1990s, provided a supportive 
environment for private investment in fertilizer distribution, by phasing out externally 
donated fertilizer programs that disrupted commercial operations, by eliminating retail price 
controls that made it unprofitable for retailers to sell fertilizer in remote areas, and by   47
abolishing import licensing quotas and foreign exchange controls that restricted competition 
among importers, and by not implementing large fertilizer subsidy programs that undercut 
commercial demand and add risks to the industry.  In response, there has been a tremendous 
investment response by private wholesalers and retailers to fertilizer market liberalization in 
the early 1990s.  It is estimated that there are now roughly 10 fertilizer importers, and over 
500 wholesalers and 8,000 retailers operating in the country.   
 
Second, and as a result of the rapid investment in fertilizer wholesaling and retailing, the 
distance that small households have to travel to access fertilizer has declined dramatically.  
Between 1997 and 2004, the average distance between households’ compounds and the 
nearest fertilizer retailer declined from 8.4kms to 4.1kms.  The more geographically dense 
network of fertilizer retailers operating in rural Kenya has greatly reduced the transaction 
costs faced by farmers in accessing fertilizer.  
 
Third, the innovativeness and cost-reducing pressures resulting from intense competition at 
the importing and wholesaling level have put downward pressure on fertilizer marketing 
margins.  Over the past decade, fertilizer (DAP) marketing margins have declined from $245 
per ton to $140 per ton.  This reduction of roughly $100 per ton is huge considering that the 
farm-gate price of fertilizer in western Kenya is currently about $400 per ton.  The farm-gate 
price would otherwise have been $500 per ton if domestic fertilizer marketing margins had 
not declined.  This 25% reduction in farm-gate fertilizer prices resulting from competition 
and cost-reduction in the marketing system has undoubtedly helped make fertilizer a 
profitable investment on a range of crops by small farmers.  Fertilizer use has been especially 
high on crops with favorable output marketing conditions:  horticultural crops and tea.   
Fertilizer use on maize has also increased in areas of moderate to high agro-ecological 
potential.  But fertilizer use has stagnated in regions where crop marketing conditions have 
deteriorated (e.g., coffee and sugar in some areas of Western Kenya).  
 
Fourth, the relative profitability of the domestic horticulture market (96% of all horticultural 
product sales in Kenya go into the domestic market, not the export market) has provided 
incentives to fertilizer maize intercropped with horticultural crops.   It is found that maize 
intercropped with horticultural crops is on the rise and are accounting for part of the increase 
in fertilizer use on intercropped maize fields.  Even in the High-Potential Maize Zones, where 
monocrop maize cultivation used to be the norm, there has been a shift from monocrop to 
intercrop, and increased use of fertilizer on maize intercropped fields.  While further analysis 
is needed to fully disentangle the facts, initial evidence suggests that part of the explanation 
for the growth in fertilizer use intensity on maize is due to the rising cultivation of maize in 
combination with high-valued crops on which fertilizer appears to be especially profitable 
(refer back to Table 11 for preliminary evidence).  Promoting a marketing environment and 
infrastructure conducive to the development of horticultural crop supply chains, as Kenya 
has, may provide opportunities to stimulate fertilizer use on grain crops for small farmers in 
other countries as well.  
 
 
9.2  Is the Kenya Situation Too Unique to Inform Policy Strategies Elsewhere?   
 
There may be reasons why the Kenya case is of only limited relevance to other parts of 
Africa.  In particular, if the agro-ecological and/or market conditions giving rise to rapid 
fertilizer growth in the past decade in Kenya are unique, then the ingredients of success here   48
may not be appropriate or applicable in most other parts of Africa.  In particular, we address a 
few potential differences: 
 
2.  To what extent is the growth in Kenya’s fertilizer use since 1990 due to the bi-modal 
pattern of crop production in some high potential areas and relatively high population 
densities?  It is possible that having two cropping seasons might explain why fertilizer use 
should be relatively high to begin with in such areas, but they do not explain why fertilizer 
growth rates over the past 15 years in particular should be so high.   In any event, most of 
Kenya’s medium- and high-potential maize growing zones have only one growing season, 
and fertilizer use appears to have grown most rapidly in these single-season crop zones.  
Also, there are many areas of Sub-Saharan Africa with population densities equal to or 
greater than rural Kenya’s (e.g., parts of Malawi, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Burundi, to 
name a few), and none of these areas have fertilizer use levels equal to Kenya’s. 
 
3.  To what extent is the growth in Kenya’s fertilizer use since 1990 due to relatively high 
maize prices that have been buoyed by import tariffs?  The Kenyan government employs 
several policy tools to keep maize prices relatively high, including import tariffs and 
marketing board operations to stabilize prices at relatively high levels.  Wholesale maize 
prices in Western Kenya (Eldoret) have averaged $174 per tonne between 1995 and 2005.  
However, inflation-adjusted maize prices and trend maize/fertilizer price (CIF Mombasa) 
ratios over the past 15 years has actually declined, as was presented in detail in Section 6.3.  
The US$ cost of importing DAP fertilizer, CIF Mombasa, has increased from a mean of $167 
per ton during the 1990-93 period, to $247 per ton during the 2002-2005 period.  Moreover, 
the real inflation-adjusted prices of maize in wholesale markets of Western Kenya have all 
trended downward over the 1985-2005 period (see data in Appendix 2 and 3), although they 
remain quite high compared to prices in neighboring countries.  Hence, from strictly a 
relative price standpoint, it is difficult to say that Kenyan farmers have enjoyed greater 
incentives to apply fertilizer as time as progressed since the early 1990s.  Nevertheless, 
smallholder fertilizer use on maize has risen moderately in the past decade, as will be shown 
below.  And most analysts familiar with Kenyan agriculture would probably agree that the 
output marketing situation for coffee, sugarcane, and possibly tea has become less favorable 
for small farmers over the past decade.  The reasons for trend growth in Kenya’s fertilizer use 
cannot generally be attributed to improved crop output marketing conditions over time.  
 
4.  To what extent is increased fertilizer use in Kenya due to innovative models for promoting 
fertilizer use in semi-arid areas (e.g., SCODP and FIPS)?  These programs have had 
important impacts on poverty reduction and food security in areas of relatively low and 
medium agro-ecological potential.  These programs have probably contributed moderately to 
national fertilizer use.  These programs have shown the benefits of distributing fertilizer in 
small packs, to improve affordability and to provide farmers with a low-risk means to 
experiment with how fertilizer performs on their fields.  Moreover, these programs have 
shown the importance of training in fertilizer usage and farm husbandry practices more 
generally in promoting fertilizer use among small farmers.  For this reason, these innovative 
models in Kenya indeed provide useful insights for promoting fertilizer use in other areas of 
Africa where fertilizer uptake has not reached its economic potential.   
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9.3   Lessons for Fertilizer Promotion Policies in Other African Countries 
 
The ultimate question posed at the beginning of this paper is whether there are lessons to be 
learned from the Kenyan case that can offer insights into the possibility of broader 
replicability in similar situations in Sub-Saharan Africa?  This study offers the following 
possibilities for consideration: 
 
1.  The findings from Kenya highlight the importance of considering fertilizer promotion 
holistically.  It is not simply a technical or logistical problem of delivering large amounts of 
fertilizer to small farmers and expecting a sustainable solution.  Getting sustained growth in 
fertilizer consumption involves building farmers’ effective demand for fertilizer, by making 
its use profitable.  This involves two major commitments from government: 
 
 (a)  making the public investments in rural infrastructure, efficient port facilities, and 
standards of commerce that provide the incentives for commercial agents (whether 
they be private, cooperative, and public sector) to invest in fertilizer importation, 
wholesaling and retailing.  A competitive system allowing low-cost entry into the 
market is necessary to enable the system to become efficient and reduce costs to 
the farmer over time. 
 (b)  Building sustainable growth in fertilizer consumption also requires a supportive 
policy environment that attracts local and foreign direct investment in building 
fertilizer and crop output markets.  The case of Kenya shows how a stable 
government policy environment has generated a private sector response that has 
helped to make fertilizer an affordable proposition for most smallholder farmers in 
the country.  In other countries, the implementation of large subsidy programs has 
inhibited the type of private investment response seen in Kenya, due to the risks 
that this introduces for private firms.   
 
2.  Access to credit to allow low-income farmers to afford to use fertilizer on food crops is a 
major problem in virtually all of Africa, primarily because, unlike some cash crops, input 
suppliers cannot be assured of recovering their loans by acquiring farmers’ surplus 
production.  However, the case of Kenya shows that solid progress can be made in improving 
small farmers’ access to credit – much better than in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
In Kenya’s case, small farmers’ access to credit for fertilizer on maize has been facilitated by 
their participation in cash cropping schemes for tea, sugar, and, especially in earlier times, 
coffee.  Farmer participation in these cash crop marketing arrangements has facilitated their 
access not only to inputs for these cash crops but also for fertilizer use on food crops (Jayne, 
Yamano, and Nyoro, 2004).  The cash crop marketing firms have found it in their interests to 
be working with farm households that are food secure and which can grow enough to meet 
their families’ needs on minimal land, which then enables them to grow more of the cash 
crop.  The firms are able to recover the credit disbursed for food crop inputs by deducting 
these loans from the sale of the farmers’ cash crop, as they do for the cash crop inputs.  In this 
way, Kenyan smallholders’ access to credit for fertilizer use on food crops has come as a 
direct result of historically hospitable investment conditions for cash crop marketing and 
processing, as has been the case for tea, sugar and, especially in earlier times, coffee.   
 
Moreover, by nurturing a steady demand for fertilizer, the historically hospitable conditions 
for cash crop marketing in Kenya (including outgrower firms and cooperatives) have been a 
major factor in the establishment of fertilizer supply chains and physical infrastructure.  The   50
existence of these reliable fertilizer supply chains has reduced the marginal costs for new 
entrants in fertilizer wholesale and retailing, because they are largely plugging in to well 
established fixed cost investments in financial systems, physical infrastructure, and 
transportation systems, which in Kenya are relatively well developed by African standards.   
Since the outgrower companies and cooperatives were mainly focused on specialty crops, 
their presence provided a large niche for new entry by retailers seeking to sell fertilizer for 
use on the major foodgrain crops.  As a result, more farmers outside as well as inside these 
interlocking systems have also enjoyed more reliable access to fertilizer (Jayne, Yamano, and 
Nyoro, 2004).  The bottom line for other countries is that opportunities should be seized upon 
to attract foreign direct investment or joint ventures in outgrower arrangements for crops well 
suited to particular country conditions.  This might be cotton and oilseed production in semi-
arid areas; tea and coffee in highland areas; sugar in riverine lowland areas, and horticulture 
in areas close to urban markets and where access to water is good.   
 
3.  The un-integrated independent importer/wholesaler/retail system serving maize farmers 
has largely succeeded in Kenya, to the extent that the percentage of farmers applying 
fertilizer on maize is roughly 65 percent nationwide and over 90 percent in the High-Potential 
areas where fertilizer use on maize is clearly profitable.  It is sometimes contended that the 
reasons driving this success may be unique in Sub-Saharan Africa.  First, most Kenyan 
smallholders have relatively high incomes by African standards.  While this is true, the 
direction of causality needs to be considered carefully.   Could relatively high incomes of 
Kenyan farmers be partially due to the historical policy decisions and investment patterns in 
prior decades, leading to increased productivity and incomes over time?   
 
4.  The importance of good governance:  The coffee sub-sector provides an interesting case of 
how declining output prices, policy and governance issues can influence farm level dis-
investment decisions, fertilizer dis-adoption, and declining productivity.  Disintegrating 
cooperative unions and alleged political interference in the marketing of coffee have 
negatively affected the returns to coffee and hence input usage.   
 
5.  There is still a need to expand the innovative systems that are showing some inroads to 
promote fertilizer use in the semi-arid parts of the country.  These programs, such as SCODP, 
FIPS, and the dealer credit programs being promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation, should 
be replicated in other parts of Africa where the benefits of fertilizer use may be insufficiently 
recognized.  
 
Even though the fertilizer picture in Kenya has been relatively positive over the past 15 years, 
there are still a number of problems.  Access to credit for poor farmers who cannot participate 
in the interlinked credit programs poses constraints on fertilizer use and poverty alleviation.  
Problems with some of the interlinked programs raise questions about the sustainability of 
these programs, many of which have worked well in past decades but are now showing signs 
of stress.  
 
Several countries in Africa are being urged to consider the idea of distributing free fertilizer 
to millions of small farmers for use on ½ hectare plots, as a means to reduce poverty and 
“kick-start” productivity growth.  In theory, a compelling case can be made to provide free or 
subsidized inputs for the poor, but in practice many of these advantages have faltered in 
implementation, either because the inputs are poorly targeted, or the subsidy programs 
undercut and stymie the development of sustainable commercial input delivery systems, or 
because the opportunity costs of running large subsidy programs are large (Gladwin et al.,   51
2002; Crawford, Jayne, and Kelly, 2005).  While non-commercial distribution programs can 
stimulate fertilizer use by subsidizing its price in areas where effective demand would 
otherwise be limited, appropriate policy choices should be based on a comprehensive 
consideration of the opportunity costs of alternative uses of the treasury outlays (e.g., might 
the same resources, if used differently, produce even greater impacts on social goals?).   
 
Fundamentally, and regardless of which type of marketing actor is chosen to do the job, 
substantially increased fertilizer use in Africa will require coming to grips with the need to 
reduce the high physical costs of exchange that impede marketing activities by all agents, 
whether they be private, parastatal, or cooperative.  This conclusion follows from 
decomposing the costs incurred in marketing of fertilizer through financial cost accounting 
techniques.  Transport and handling costs in most African countries account for a large 
fraction of domestic marketing margins – up to 50% or more. The sum of importer, 
wholesaler and retailer profit margins generally account for less than 10% (Jayne et al., 
2003).   
 
Notwithstanding the necessity of developing coordination arrangements for reducing 
transaction costs as part of a comprehensive approach to market development, we also stress 
the need to maintain adequate focus on reducing transformation costs of marketing as well.  
Our analysis indicates that domestic marketing costs can be reduced through the following:  
reducing port fees, coordinating the timing of fertilizer clearance from the port with up-
country transport, reducing transport costs through port, rail, and road improvements, 
reducing taxes on fuel, and reducing the uncertainty associated with government input 
distribution programs that impose additional marketing costs on traders.  Estimated 
reductions in the farm-gate price of fertilizer from implementing the full range of options 
range from 11 to 18% (Jayne et al., 2003). 
 
A forward-looking approach to input market development also requires attention to the 
various factors affecting farmers’ willingness to pay for fertilizer. Raising farmers’ 
willingness to pay for fertilizer involves public sector support for agricultural research 
systems, the generation of seed technologies more responsive to fertilizer application, the 
establishment and dissemination of appropriate input recommendation domains (as opposed 
to one blanket recommendation for an entire country), viable systems for financing farmer 
input needs, market information, effective institutions for contract enforcement, and public 
investments in infrastructure and telecommunications to attract new investments by 
commodity marketing firms.  These “public goods” investments, often considered outside the 
scope of fertilizer marketing policy, nevertheless strongly affect the demand for fertilizer and 
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APPENDIX 1.  TOTAL FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION IN KENYA 
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APPENDIX 2.  NOMINAL AND REAL MAIZE WHOLESALE PRICES, VARIOUS 
MARKETS IN WESTERN KENYA, 1985/96 TO 2003/04.  
 
nominal prices (Ksh/90kgs)  2005 real prices (Ksh/90kgs)  Crop 
year  Eldoret Kitale  Nakuru 
CPI 
2005  Eldoret Kitale  Nakuru 
1985/86 283  213  188  0.093  3045  2292  2023 
1986/87 265  208  183  0.097  2722  2137  1880 
1987/88 272  250  200  0.105  2595  2385  1908 
1988/89 NA  225  158  0.117  NA  1931  1356 
1989/90 272  243  216  0.132  2067  1847  1642 
1990/91 291  316  296  0.152  1913  2077  1946 
1991/92 450  652  510  0.183  2465  3572  2794 
1992/93 760  658  710  0.250  3038  2631  2839 
1993/94 1091  953  1095  0.373  2927  2557  2938 
1994/95 776  667  786  0.469  1653  1421  1675 
1995/96 572  547  627  0.486  1177  1126  1290 
1996/97 1131  1110  1150  0.505  2240  2198  2277 
1997/98 1184  1128  1173  0.535  2213  2108  2193 
1998/99 905  1100  974  0.572  1582  1923  1703 
1999/00 1246  1138  1342  0.624  1997  1824  2151 
2000/01 NA  1000  1319  0.690  NA  1449  1912 
2001/02 NA  630  859  0.707  NA  891  1215 
2002/03 NA  856  1090  0.747  NA  1146  1459 
2003/04 NA  1414  1286  0.813  NA  1739  1582 
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APPENDIX 3.  NOMINAL PRICE OF DAP FERTILIZER AND WHOLESALE 
MAIZE-TO-DAP PRICE RATIOS (1KG MAIZE/1KG DAP). 
 
      nominal       




(1kg maize – 1 kg DAP) 
Crop 
season  Eldoret  Kitale  Nakuru   Nakuru   Eldoret  Kitale  Nakuru 
1988/89 NA  225  158           
1989/90  272 243 216   443      0.282  0.198 
1990/91  291 316 296   451    0.335  0.299  0.266 
1991/92  450 652 510   633    0.255  0.277  0.260 
1992/93  760 658 710   660    0.379  0.549  0.429 
1993/94 1091  953  1095   1070   0.395  0.342  0.369 
1994/95  776 667 786   1347    0.450  0.393  0.452 
1995/96  572 547 627   1099    0.392  0.337  0.397 
1996/97  1131 1110 1150   1200    0.265  0.253  0.290 
1997/98  1184 1128 1173   1187    0.529  0.520  0.538 
1998/99 905  1100  974   1246   0.528  0.503  0.523 
1999/00  1246 1138 1342   1336    0.376  0.457  0.405 
2000/01 NA  1000  1319   1176   0.589  0.538  0.634 
2001/02 NA  630  859   1330     0.418  0.551 
2002/03 NA  856  1090   1180     0.297  0.404 
2003/04 NA  1414  1286   1624     0.293  0.373 
2004/05  NA NA NA   1593      0.493  0.448 
 
Note:  price ratios are computed based on year t for DAP and year t-1 for maize, since maize prices 
for year t are not known at planting time when DAP is purchased by farmers.  
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture, Market Information Bureau. 
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APPENDIX 4.  COST BUILD-UP FOR CAN FROM ROMANIA, JUNE 2004 
 
Exchange Rate: 1US$=          79.00    
PARTICULARS   SIGHT LC    
FOB Costanza (Romania)         165.00    
Freight (Costanza to Mombasa)            35.0    
C&F Mombasa          200.00    
Finance Cost 0.4% per Month               -      
Insurance 1.5% C&F            3.00    
Total CIF Mombasa         203.00    
L/c Opening Commission 0.5% of C&F            1.00    
L/c Usance Commission 0.125%*               -      
Sub total            1.00    
TOTAL (IN US$ PER TON)         204.00    
TOTAL COST PER 50kg BAG I KSH..         805.80    
EXPENSES AT THE PORT(value in US$)    
IDF 2.75% of CIF            5.58    
Customs duty               -      
Shore handling US$ 5.00/ton            5.00    
Stevedoring charges            8.00    
Ship cleaning and trimming            7.00    
Bags and Bagging          15.50    
VAT 16% of shore handling            0.80    
Sub-total           41.88    
    
Total amount in US$         245.88    
TOTAL COST IN KSHS. PER TON    19,424.72    
TOTAL COST PER 50kg BAG I KSH..         971.24    
(b) ADD: Other Charges:KSHS     
MSS transport Levy @ 10/=/ton          10.00    
Incidental charges (1% of CIF)         160.37    
Sub total         170.37    
Total handling cost into warehouse- Mombasa    19,595.09    
TOTAL LANDED COST PER 50KG - MOMBASA         979.75    
HANDLING COST INTO INLAND DEPOTS**   NAIROBI    NAKURU   
Transport costs to Inland depots per 50kgs bag ***             121             160  
Handling cost into store                  5                5  
Stacking                 5                5  
Sub total             131             170  
TOTAL HANDLING COST INTO INLAND 
DEPOTS 
        1,111          1,150  
ADD PROFIT MARGIN -about  7%               78               81  
EX-STORE SELLING PRICES -PER 50kg BAG          1,189          1,231  
** Costing calculations based on Sight LC     
*** Transport cost - ksh.0.25 per 50kg bag per Km   
Source: Authors’ computation and NCPB data 
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APPENDIX 5.  COST BUILD-UP FOR DAP, JUNE 2005 
 
COST CALCULATIONS ON IMPORTED DAP       
Exchange Rate: 1US$=          75.00       
        
PARTICULARS   SIGHT LC       
FOB Costanza (Romania)         228.56       
Freight (Costanza to Mombasa)            72.5       
C&F Mombasa          301.06       
Finance Cost 0.4% per Month               -          
Insurance 1.5% C&F            4.52       
Total CIF Mombasa         305.58       
L/c Opening Commission 0.5% of C&F            1.51       
L/c Usance Commission 0.125%*               -          
Sub total            1.51       
TOTAL (IN US$ PER TON)         307.08       
TOTAL COST PER 50kg BAG I KSH..      1,151.55       
        
EXPENSES AT THE PORT(value in US$)        
IDF 2.75% of CIF            8.40       
Customs duty               -          
Shore handling US$ 5.00/ton            5.00       
Stevedoring charges            8.00       
Ship cleaning and trimming            7.00       
Bags and Bagging          15.50       
VAT 16% of shore handling            0.80       
Sub-total           44.70       
Total amount in US$         351.78       
        
TOTAL COST IN KSHS. PER TON    26,383.84       
TOTAL COST PER 50kg BAG I KSH..      1,319.19       
        
(b) ADD: Other Charges:KSHS         
MSS transport Levy @ 10/=/ton          10.00       
Incidental charges (1% of CIF)         241.40       
Sub total         251.40       
Total handling cost into warehouse- Mombasa    26,635.25       
TOTAL LANDED COST PER 50KG - MOMBASA      1,331.76       
        
HANDLING COST INTO INLAND DEPOTS**   NAIROBI    NAKURU   ELDORET    KITALE   
Transport costs to Inland depots per 50kgs bag ***             121            160            205           217  
Handling cost into store                  5               5                 5               5  
Stacking                 5               5                 5               5  
Sub total             131            170            215           227  
TOTAL HANDLING COST INTO INLAND 
DEPOTS 
        1,463         1,502         1,547         1,558 
ADD PROFIT MARGIN -about  7%             102            105            108           109  
EX-STORE SELLING PRICES -PER 50kg BAG          1,565         1,607         1,655         1,667 
** Costing calculations based on Sight LC         
*** Transport cost - ksh.0.25 per 50kg bag per Km       
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APPENDIX 6.  US$ DAP FERTILIZER PRICES AT MOMBASA AND NAKURU, AND THE DAP MARKETING MARGIN, 
1990/01-2004/05 
 
  ---------------------  wholesale price, Nakuru ---------------------------  CIF Mombasa  Marketing Margin, Mombasa-Nakuru 
   nominal Ksh per 50kg   Ksh/US$  nominal US$ per MT  US$/mt  US$/mt  US$/mt 












F  using series 1 
 
G=D-F 




1990/01  450 451  23  390  391 159  231  232 
1991/92 637  633  28  461  458  190  271  268 
1992/93 825  660  32  512  410  179  333  231 
1993/94 1015  1070  58  350  369  139  211  230 
1994/95 1300  1347  56  464  481  178  286  303 
1995/96 1130  1099  51  443  431  214  229  217 
1996/97 1380  1200  57  484  421  210  274  211 
1997/98 1200  1187  59  409  405  200  209  205 
1998/99 1250  1246  60  414  413  206  208  207 
1999/00 1350  1336  70  384  380  183  201  197 
2000/01 1250  1176  76  328  309  160  168  149 
2001/02 1150  1330  79  292  338  241  51  97 
2002/03 1125  1180  79  286  300  155  131  145 
2003/04 1500  1624  76  395  428  246  149  182 
2004/05 1680  1593  79  424  402  290  134  112 
2005/06 1650  1490  73  452  408  297  155  111 
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APPENDIX 7.  REAL KENYAN SHILLING DAP PRICES AT MOMBASA AND 







Marketing margin,  
Mombasa-Nakuru 
 
  (nominal Ksh per 
50kg)   nominal 
 CPI 
(2005=1)   Real Ksh per 50 kg 
     Ksh/50kg       





   A   B  C  D  E=(A-C)÷D  F=(B-C)÷D 
1990/01 450  451  183  0.166  1602  1611 
1991/92 637  633  263  0.199  1886  1864 
1992/93 825  660  288  0.275  1953  1352 
1993/94 1015  1070  403  0.420  1458  1589 
1994/95 1300  1347  499  0.462  1734  1836 
1995/96 1130  1099  546  0.486  1203  1139 
1996/97 1380  1200  599  0.505  1546  1190 
1997/98 1200  1187  587  0.535  1147  1122 
1998/99 1250  1246  622  0.572  1099  1092 
1999/00 1350  1336  644  0.624  1132  1110 
2000/01 1250  1176  609  0.690  928  821 
2001/02 1150  1330  950  0.707  283  538 
2002/03 1125  1180  610  0.747  689  763 
2003/04 1500  1624  934  0.813  697  849 
2004/05 1680  1593  1148  0.894  594  497 
2005/06 1650  1490  1084  1.000  566  406 
 
Source: MoA for Nakuru wholesale, FMB weekly fertilizer reports for CIF Mombasa 
 
 
 